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Abstract
Pervasive computing leads to an increased integration between the real world and the computational world, and many applications in pervasive computing adapt to the user’s context,
such as the location of the user and relevant devices, the presence of other people, light or
sound conditions, or available network bandwidth, to meet a user’s continuously changing
requirements without taking explicit input from the users.
We consider a class of applications that wish to consider a user’s context when deciding
whether to authorize a user’s access to important physical or information resources. Such
a context-sensitive authorization scheme is necessary when a mobile user moves across
multiple administrative domains where they are not registered in advance. Also, users
interacting with their environment need a non-intrusive way to access resources, and clues
about their context may be useful input into authorization policies for these resources.
Existing systems for context-sensitive authorization take a logic-based approach, because
a logical language makes it possible to define a context model where a contextual fact
is expressed with a boolean predicate and to derive higher-level context information and
authorization decisions from contextual facts.
However, those existing context-sensitive authorization systems have a central server
that collects context information, and evaluates policies to make authorization decisions on
behalf of a resource owner. A centralized solution assumes that all resource owners trust
the server to make correct decisions, and all users trust the server not to disclose private
context information. In many realistic applications of pervasive computing, however, the
resources, users, and sources of context information are inherently distributed among many
organizations that do not necessarily trust each other. Resource owners may not trust the
integrity of context information produced by another domain, and context sensors may not
trust others with the confidentiality of data they provide about users.
In this thesis, we present a secure distributed proof system for context-sensitive authorization. Our system enables multiple hosts to evaluate an authorization query in a peer-topeer way, while preserving the confidentiality and integrity policies of mutually untrusted
ii

principals running those hosts. We also develop a novel caching and revocation mechanism to support context-sensitive policies that refer to information in dozens of different
administrative domains. Contributions of this thesis include the definition of fine-grained
security policies that specify trust relations among principals in terms of information confidentiality and integrity, the design and implementation of a secure distributed proof system,
a proof for the correctness of our algorithm, and a performance evaluation showing that the
amortized performance of our system scales to dozens of servers in different domains.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Pervasive computing, also called ubiquitous computing, leads to an increased integration
between the real world and the computational world [117]. Our daily environment will
be embedded with hundreds of thousands of devices, which have computation and communication capabilities, and people can concentrate on their task by interacting with those
devices in such a smart environment, rather than working with general-purpose desktop
computers. The vision of pervasive computing has been increasingly feasible as a crucial
set of hardware components have been developed [116] over the last decade. There are
many hand-held and wearable devices commercially available, and those can (or could) interact with each other through wireless networking technologies, such as IEEE 802.11b and
Bluetooth. The advent of sensor networks [94] will lead to environments with thousands
or millions of embedded sensors that can provide detailed context information.
Successful applications become context-aware, able to automatically adapt to the changing conditions in which they execute. Context-aware applications use context information,
such as the location of the user and relevant devices, the presence of other people, light or
sound conditions, or available network bandwidth, to meet a user’s continuously changing
requirements without taking explicit input from the users. Therefore, a system in pervasive
1

computing needs to define rules or policies to specify how it dynamically adapts itself to
a changing user’s context. For example, Schilit [104] applies if-then rules to change the
behavior of their system to adapt to a user’s changing context.
Besides defining triggering actions, many systems [28, 49, 95, 104] in pervasive computing apply a logic-based language to derive high-level context information from raw
sensor data. Many context-aware applications need high-level context information (e.g.,
a user’s attending a meeting) to grasp the user’s intent and provide services that meet his
requirements appropriately. A logic-based language is suitable for this purpose, because
we can use the same logic-based language to express both contextual facts that correspond
to raw sensor data and rules that derive higher-level context information. For example, suppose that a location-tracking system keeps track of the location of Bob’s PDA and that location is expressed as location(pda12 , sudikoff ), which means that pda12 is in the sudikoff
building. Suppose also that the fact owner (Bob, pda12 ) is known to the system. Then,
Bob’s location could be derived using the rule location(P, L) ← owner (P, D), location(D, L),
which derives the location of a user P from the location of device D that belongs to user
P.
One promising application of the logic-based approach is a context-sensitive authorization system [5, 32] that considers a requester’s context as well as his identity to make
a granting decision; the system derives the granting decision (true or false) with a set of
rules encoding policies and facts encoding context information. A context-sensitive authorization scheme is necessary when mobile users move across multiple administrative
domains in which a different authority defines security policies, because those users are
not registered into systems in each domain in advance. Also, users interacting with their
environments need a non-intrusive way to access resources, and clues about their context
may be useful input into authorization policies for these resources.
For example, imagine a “smart meeting room” with many embedded devices. The
2

current whiteboard may be replaced with a networked virtual whiteboard. The meeting
attendees may read or write to it using their PDAs or other small devices in this room via
a wireless network. Since it is not practical to restrict the networked access to the board
physically as we do today, we need a new mechanism to restrict access to such resources.
The current access-control mechanism, based on a static access-control list (ACL), does
not work for this purpose, because it is impossible to modify the ACL for each meeting.
One reasonable policy, corresponding to one for a physical whiteboard, may be to allow
people in the meeting room to access the board only during the time slot specified in the
meeting calendar file. Thus, the authorization policy is location and time dependent, i.e., if
the principal P is in the room during the meeting time, P is granted to access the virtual
whiteboard. There are many other devices in the meeting room, such as the air conditioner,
projector, and light-level controller, which may be managed with similar context-sensitive
policies.
We can use context-sensitive policies to handle exceptional situations. Consider a
health-care application, in which policy dictates that medical records may be accessed only
by a patient’s primary physician. A different doctor in the emergency room, however, needs
to access the patient’s medical record if the condition of that patient is critical. In this case,
we may specify the context-sensitive authorization policy using the location of the patient,
a list of nearby doctors defined by some notion of proximity, and current medical sensor
data about the patient such as heart rate and blood pressure.
Finally, context-sensitive policies are useful for an emergency-response system [58,
100] that contains an information dissemination infrastructure for responders in a disastrous incident. The system collects information on disaster status and casualties in an incident from biomedical and environmental sensors and provides that information to the first
responders and the command centers. The first responders are responsible for rescuing and
evacuating casualties, and they obtain information on the situation of the incident and med3

ical conditions of the casualties in that incident with their wireless portable or wearable
devices. However, access to the information on the incident must be limited on a needto-know basis to prevent an attack by an adversary who exploits the information on the
incident. Since the responders need to access information or resources managed by different state or local agencies, we adopt context-sensitive authorization policies that consider a
responder’s location, or severity of casualties near that responder, to grant access to critical
information (such as the location of other responders or status of various equipment) or to
a resource (such as a vehicle or other rescue equipment). In summary, context-sensitive authorization allows users to define a flexible policy by referring to environmental variables,
attributes of objects and users, and both static and dynamic relationships between objects
and between users.

1.1

Research challenges

When we apply context-sensitive policies to systems for pervasive computing, we must address the issue of information sharing among different organizations, because each sensing
system that keeps track of a user’s context information is owned by a different organization.
Most organizations possess a certain physical boundary inside which they themselves can
exclusively deploy sensing systems into their facilities. Therefore, a context-aware application that keeps track of a mobile user that crosses the organizational boundaries needs
to obtain context information from multiple organizations to keep track of the user’s context continuously. For example, imagine a large office building where there are sensors
managed by the city, the building owner, the companies leasing space, and the individual
employees. A location-aware application in that building might need to access multiple
indoor location tracking systems in different organizations. Furthermore, there are many
situations where sensing systems in the same area are managed by different organizations.
4

For example, the facility department of a company, which manages an office environment,
controls the condition of light and temperature in the building, while the computer service
department keeps track of the location of users that carry a wireless device.
However, existing context-sensitive authorization systems [5, 8, 24, 32, 57, 88, 112]
have a central server that collects context information, and evaluates policies to make authorization decisions on behalf of a resource owner. A centralized solution assumes that all
resource owners trust the server to make correct decisions, and all users trust the server not
to disclose private context information. Without such a universally trusted principal, it is
impossible to build a system that maintains the global knowledge of all the context information. Cross-domain authentication [15, 25, 43] supports user authentication across multiple
administrative domains. However, it is not address the issue of assigning privileges for
accessing local resources to foreign users.
To achieve such information sharing among organizations, we must address two trust
issues. First, each administrative domain (organization) defines confidentiality policies to
protect information in that domain. It is necessary for an administrator of a location tracking system to protect users’ location privacy [13, 88], for example. Another example is a
server that maintains patients’ medical records. The server must respect HIPAA rules about
the confidentiality of medical records [1]. Therefore, a requester must satisfy the confidentiality policies of an information provider to access the requested information. Second,
each administrative domain defines integrity policies that specify whether to trust information from other domains in terms of the integrity (correctness) of that information. Because
context information is computed from raw sensor data, it inherently involves uncertainty. It
is, therefore, important for each domain to choose reliable sources of information to derive
correct context information.

5

1.2

Secure distributed proof system

In this thesis, we propose a secure distributed proof system that makes an authorization
decision based on context-sensitive policies, addressing the issue of information sharing
among multiple administrative domains. We take a logic-based approach for an authorization system [60, 124, 125]. When a client requests access to a resource, the resource owner
constructs a logical proof that derives a granting decision. If such a proof is successfully
constructed, access may be granted; otherwise access is denied.
To define the problem of information sharing precisely, we make a few assumptions.
First, context information and rules that express authorization polices are distributed across
servers in different administrative domains. There are other rules that derive higher-level
context information. Second, an administrator of each domain defines confidentiality policies to protect context information and rules in that domain. Third, an administrator of each
domain defines integrity policies that express the administrator’s trust in the correctness of
rules and facts in other domains. Although a method for obtaining accurate or trustworthy context information [51] is an important research agenda in pervasive computing, we
assume that each administrator knows which information in other domains are trusted in
terms of its integrity and is thus able to define integrity policies properly. When an administrator trusts the integrity of information in other domains, that means that the administrators
agree on the semantics of the logical expression of that information. Therefore, our thesis
does not address the issue of how to agree on the semantics of information among multiple
parties. Furthermore, trust relationships in terms of confidentiality and integrity are defined
by principals, each of which represents a specific user or organization, and we assume that
each host is associated with one principal (e.g., the owner of a PDA, or the manager of a
server). In practice, one principal may manage multiple devices, but for generality here we
assume one principal per device.

6

Query
Query
Sub−proof
tree
Sub−query

Host A
Sub−query

Proof tree
Sub−proof
tree
Host A

Host B

Sub−proof
tree
Host C

(a) Centralized authorization server

(b) Decentralized multiple authorization servers

Figure 1.1: Decentralized evaluation of an authorization query. The proof of a query is
decomposed into sub-proofs and produced on distributed multiple hosts. On the left, Host
A generates a whole proof on a centralized server. On the right, Host A, B, and C produce
only a subtree of the proof.
Our major research goal is to build a distributed proof system that obtains an authorization decision by collaborating multiple mutually untrusted principals in a peer-to-peer
way; that is, if a principal that handles an authorization query does not have all of the
necessary information, the principal could send subsequent queries to other principals, and
those principals handle those queries in the same way. The core of our approach is a proof
decomposition in a distributed environment according to each principal’s integrity policies;
that is, rather than depending on a central trusted server (Figure 1.1a), we decompose a
proof into sub-proofs produced by multiple hosts (Figure 1.1b). This collaboration is only
possible if the querier can trust the integrity of other hosts (to provide correct facts and to
properly evaluate rules) and if the other hosts can trust the querier with confidential facts.
In this thesis, we show that our secure distributed proof system meets three key goals
by presenting our algorithm, the design of the system, and the results of our experiments
that measure the performance of our system. These goals are:
7

Confidentiality: Information used for making an authorization decision is protected according to confidentiality policies defined by the owner of that information.
Integrity: Each principal receives a proof that satisfies his integrity policies from a principal that handles the query.
Scalability: Our target application could involves dozens of principals in different domains, and our system, therefore, should work with that many principals with reasonable performance.

1.3

Contributions

We summarize the contributions of this dissertation below.
• We introduce fine-grained security policies to formally define trust relations among
principals in terms of information confidentiality and integrity.
• We show that it is possible to derive an authorization decision, even though authorization rules and context information referred to by those rules are distributed across
multiple domains and are protected with different confidentiality policies. We develop a distributed algorithm that enables multiple principals to construct a proof
in a peer-to-peer way, while preserving the integrity and confidentiality policies of
those principals. We also prove the correctness of our algorithm.
• We design and implement a system that supports the distributed algorithm to study
the performance of the system. We also develop a caching and revocation mechanism
based on capabilities. Our revocation mechanism revokes all the cached information
that depends on an initially revoked fact across the servers.

8

• We measure the performance of our system and show that the amortized performance
of our system scales to a large proof that spans across dozens of servers. Our system
is, therefore, suitable to a context-aware application in which a user’s privileges must
be continuously monitored. The results of our experiments with a wide range of
parameters should serve as guidelines about the worst-case performance of a systems
that adopts our techniques.

1.4

Dissertation outline

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 introduces our authorization rule language and also defines integrity and
confidentiality policies that formally define trust relations between principals.
Chapter 3 describes the design of a secure distributed proof system for a simple case
in which confidentiality and integrity policies are defined only on facts. We introduce key
ideas that enables secure distributed proving.
Chapter 4 extends the design of the system in Chapter 3 for a general case in which
policies are defined on rules as well. We provide a proof for the correctness of the algorithm.
Chapter 5 describes the design of our caching and revocation mechanism based on
capabilities.
Chapter 6 presents our experimental results that demonstrate the effectiveness of our
caching mechanism.
Chapter 7 compares our system with related work in rule-based authorization, contextsensitive authorization, and distributed proof systems.
Chapter 8 discusses limitations of our system and suggestions for future work.
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Security policies
In this section, we describe our language for defining authorization policies that protect
resources and introduce the concept of a proof tree, which is constructed when making
an authorization decision. Next, we introduce confidentiality policies that protect both
authorization policies and context information and integrity policies that specify trust in
the correctness of those information. We also extend the notion of integrity to a proof tree.

2.1

Authorization rule language

In rule-based authorization systems, authorization policies are represented as logical expressions. We express authorization policies with Horn clauses since they are expressive
enough to support policies in existing rule-based authorization systems [5, 8, 32]. We do
not use a general first-order logic, which is not decidable in general. The syntax of a Horn
clause is b ← a1 ∧ a2 . . . ∧ an , which says that simple statements called atoms a1 through
an , if all true, imply b. The atom b is called the head of the clause, and the atoms a1 , . . . , an
the body of the clause. An atom is formed from a predicate symbol followed by a parenthesized list of variables and constants. Our authorization policies do not support negation
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of atoms because it is impossible to collect complete information in a distributed environment. Also, we do not support atoms that take general functions as parameters. When there
is no atoms in the body of a Horn clause, the atom in the body of the clause represents a
fact, which is true without any conditions. For example, we can express the contextual fact
“Bob is in Hanover” as location(Bob, Hanover). We assume that each principal stores its
authorization policies and facts in a knowledge base. We express both contextual and static
facts in the same way. The difference is that contextual facts in the knowledge base are
updated dynamically.

Example authorization rules.

The teams responding to a large-scale disaster are coordi-

nated by experts drawn from multiple disciplines (fire, police, medical) and often multiple
jurisdictions (city, state, federal). Increasingly, incident commanders use software to assist
with incident management and situational awareness. The National Incident Management
System (NIMS) [58] defines clear roles for the many participants in a large-scale response,
so role-based access control (RBAC) [103] is a natural basis for protecting resources in an
incident management system (IMS). Such an IMS needs to dynamically link people, resources, and information from multiple domains, providing information to those who need
it in a time of crisis.
We give an example scenario1 in which roles in such an incident management system
is defined based on contextual situation of responders. Suppose that an incident occurs in
an airport. There is a surveillance camera image server managed by the airport, and the
chief of operations (bob) wishes to use the camera images to improve his awareness of the
situation. Figure 2.1 shows a set of rules that define the airport’s policy to grant access
to the camera resource, which allows the local police chief access to the images whenever
he is in the airport, as determined by either his Wi-Fi network connection or by the GPS
1

Note that this is not an official scenario defined by NIMS.
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tracking device in his radio. Rule 1 says that principal P must hold the role operation chief
to be granted, and rule 2 defines the two conditions to hold that role. The first condition
specifies the prerequisite role police chief in a police department, and the second requires
principal P to be in the airport. Rules 3–5 specify how we derive the location of principal
P from the raw location information of a device.

2.2

Proof tree

To make an authorization decision, we must check whether a proof tree for query ?grant(P )
can be constructed with a given set of rules and facts. The proof tree consists of nodes that
represent rules (or facts) and edges that represent the unification that replaces an atom in
the body of a rule in a parent node with the atoms in the body of a rule or a fact in a child
node. Every leaf node contains a fact that has no atom in its body.
Given the facts listed in Figure 2.1, we can construct the proof tree shown in Figure 2.2
by unifying the query with the first four rules, substituting variables as needed. We return to
this example in Sections 3.6 and 4.7 to explain how we construct this proof in a distributed
fashion.

2.3

Rule patterns

We first introduce the notion of rule patterns, which are mechanisms for expressing confidentiality and integrity policies on rules and facts in a knowledge base. A rule pattern is just
a regular Horn clause to be unified with a rule or a fact in the knowledge base. We use a rule
pattern to specify to which rules and facts a given policy is applied, because it is infeasible
to specify a policy on each instance of a rule or a fact that contains variables. A rule pattern
is associated with a set of rules or facts that match it through unification, a pattern-matching
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Rules:
grant(P )
role(P, operation chief)
location(P, L)
location(D, L)
location(D, L)

←
←
←
←
←

role(P, operation chief)
roleIn(P, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(P, airport)
owner(P, D) ∧ location(D, L)
wif i(D, A) ∧ in(A, L)
gps(D, X, Y ) ∧ closeT o(X, Y, L)

(2.1)
(2.2)
(2.3)
(2.4)
(2.5)

Facts:
roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept).
owner(bob, pda15).
wif i(pda15, ap39).
in(ap39, airport).

Bob is chief of the local police department.
Bob owns device pda15.
pda15 is associated with access point ap39.
Access point ap39 is at the airport.

(2.6)
(2.7)
(2.8)
(2.9)

Figure 2.1: Sample set of rules. We use uppercase for variables and lowercase for constants
and names.

?grant(bob)

grant(bob) ← role(bob, operation chief)

role(bob, operation chief) ← roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(bob, airport)

roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept)

location(bob, airport) ← owner(bob, pda15) ∧ location(pda15, airport)

PSfrag replacements

owner(bob, pda15)

location(pda15, airport) ← wif i(pda15, ap39) ∧ in(ap39, airport)

ps(D, X, Y ) ∧ closeT o(X, Y, L)
wif i(pda15, ap39)

in(ap39, airport)

Figure 2.2: Example proof tree based on the rules in Figure 2.1.
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process that makes a rule pattern and an actual rule in the knowledge base identical by instantiating variables in the rule pattern. For example, the rule pattern location(bob, X) is
matched with the fact location(bob, hanover ) in the knowledge base, because the variable
X can be instantiated to hanover . It does not match with the fact location(alice, hanover ),
however. The rule pattern role(X, Y ) ← occupation(X, Y ) ∧ location(X, hospital ) can
be matched with the rule below by instantiating X to P and Y to physician.

role(P, physician) ← occupation(P, physician) ∧ location(P, hospital )

A principal may define as many security policies as it sees fit to define. Each security policy
(rp, t) is represented as a rule pattern rp and a set of trusted principals t. There are two
kinds of security policies: integrity policies and confidentiality policies.

2.4

Integrity policies

Integrity policies express trust in the correctness of rules and facts. Our definition is based
on information flow theory [14, 134], which focuses on confidence in the accuracy of information rather than modification of information. When a principal pi defines the integrity
policy (rp, t) it means that pi trusts those principals in t, a set that we denote trust i (rp), to
be correct in whatever rules or facts match pattern rp. We use subscript i in the trust policy
to denote which principal defines the policy.
The integrity of a fact means that the boolean value representing a fact is correct. For
example, if principal p0 includes principal p1 in its trust 0 (loc(P, X)), then principal p0
believes that p1 ’s evaluation (true or false) of a location query of the form ?loc(P, X) (e.g.,
?loc(bob, hanover )) is correct. On the other hand, the integrity of a rule means that the rule
itself is able to correctly derive a new fact. For example, if principal p0 includes principal

14

p1 in its rule pattern trust 0 (loc(P, X) ← WiFi (P, Y ) ∧ in(Y, X)), then p0 believes that
p1 ’s rule loc(bob, X) ← WiFi (bob, Y ) ∧ in(Y, X) is a correct rule to resolve the query of
the form ?loc(bob, hanover ). In other words, principal p0 believes that it is valid to replace
the query loc(bob, hanover ) with two sub-queries ?WiFi (bob, Y ) and ?in(Y, hanover ).
Principal p0 can verify that principal p1 applied the rule correctly to derive the conclusion
by checking the integrity of a proof tree defined in Section 2.4.1.
Notice that trust on a fact is a stronger notion than trust on a rule. Trust on a fact
implicitly trusts the rules used to derive that fact. For example, the trust on the rule pattern
loc(X, Y ) implicitly indicates trust of any rule whose head can be unified with loc(X, Y ).

2.4.1

Integrity of a proof tree

A principal trusts the integrity of a proof tree (that is, believes its result) for a query if it
is consistent with its integrity policies. We formally define the integrity of a proof tree
from the viewpoint of an initial querier principal p0 inductively as follows. Suppose that
principal p0 issues a query q to principal p1 .
Base case (single-node tree): If the proof from principal p1 contains a query q’s result,
and principal p0 has an integrity policy (rp, t) such that rule pattern rp matches query
q and p1 belongs to the set of principals t, then p0 trusts the results of the proof tree.
Induction step: If the proof from p1 contains a proof tree whose root node represents a
rule r, the head of rule r matches query q, p0 has an integrity policy (rp, t) such that
rule pattern rp matches r and p1 belongs to the set of principals t, and p0 trusts the
integrity of the subproof trees under the root node representing r, then p0 trusts the
proof tree.
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2.5

Confidentiality policies

Confidentiality policies protect facts and rules in a principal’s knowledge base. A fact must
be protected if it contains confidential information. A rule must be protected if confidential
information may be inferred from reading the rule. For example, the rule grant(P ) ←
loc(bob, sudikoff ) says that any principal P is granted access when bob is at the location
of sudikoff building. If a request is granted, the requester may infer that bob is at Sudikoff,
which might not be public knowledge.
When a principal pi defines the confidentiality policy (rp, t), it means that pi trusts
those principals in t, which we often refer to as the access control list acli (rp), with facts
or rules matching rule pattern rp. Principal p0 only responds to a query q from principal p1 if there exists a rule pattern rp that can be unified with the query q and principal p1 belongs to acl0 (rp). For example, suppose that principal p0 defines the policy
acl 0 (location(bob, L)) = {p1 , p2 }; principal p0 responds to a query ?location(bob, hanover )
from principal p1 , because rule pattern location(bob, L) matches with location(bob, hanover ).

2.6

Assumptions

In this thesis, we make a few assumptions to maintain our focus on the confidentiality and
integrity issues in a distributed context-sensitive authorization system. First, integrity policies of every principal are public knowledge. Second, each principal can gain knowledge
about whether it has a privilege of accessing information on a given fact from other principals. It is possible for a principal to infer that knowledge by issuing a query about that fact
to those principals. If the requesting principal receives a query result, that principal possesses the privilege. If the request is denied, that means that the principal does not possess
the privilege. However, the denial of a query request does not reveal any information on
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whether the principal that receives the query actually has knowledge about the fact in the
query or not. Third, we assume that each principal’s confidentiality policies on rules are
not public knowledge because a confidentiality policy on a rule discloses the fact that the
principal possesses a rule that matches the rule pattern of that confidentiality policy. Third,
a public-key infrastructure is available and every principal can obtain the public key of
other participants, so that they can establish secure channels with a session key and verify
the authenticity of messages with digital signatures.
For purposes of simplifying our explanation, we consider the basic case that supports
security policies only on facts first in Chapter 3, and then the general case that supports
security policies on facts and rules in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 3
Secure distributed proof system for the
basic case
In this chapter, we describe our secure distributed proof system for the basic case that
supports security policies only on facts. We first describe the architecture of the system
and introduce the notion of proof decomposition in a distributed environment. We then
cover a mechanism for enforcing confidentiality policies and give a distributed algorithm
for evaluating a logical query in a peer-to-peer way.

3.1

Architecture

With no central server to make authorization decisions, we use multiple hosts that are administered by different principals. Without loss of generality, we assume that each host i
is administered by a different principal pi , although in many realistic environments there
may be principals that own or manage many hosts. Each host stores a local copy of its principal’s integrity and confidentiality policies. Each host provides an interface for handling
queries from remote hosts, and may ask other hosts to resolve any subqueries necessary. In
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Host

User

Request

Service

Authorization
Query

Logical
Query

Host
Host

Host

Host
Host

Figure 3.1: The hosts enclosed in the dotted lines make an authorization decision in a
collaborative way.
Figure 3.1, a user sends a request to the server that provides some service, and the server
issues an authorization query to a host it chooses in order to make a granting decision. If
the host that receives the query does not have all the rules and facts for making the decision,
it issues subsequent queries to other hosts, and this process could be iterated recursively.
There is no single host that manages other hosts, and multiple hosts instead handle a query
in a peer-to-peer way.
All the hosts have an identical structure, which is shown in Figure 3.2. The query
handler handles queries from other hosts and enforces the local confidentiality policies.
The inference engine constructs a proof tree for a given query based on the rules and facts
in the local knowledge base. If some query cannot be evaluated locally, the inference
engine issues a remote query to another host through the query issuer. The inference engine
is created per query by the query handler; multiple queries are handled concurrently by
multiple threads of the inference engine objects. The query issuer refers to its local integrity
policies to choose a principal whose evaluation of the query is trusted; the integrity policies
serve as a directory service to choose a principal to which it sends a query. The query issuer
receives a reply and checks its integrity based on the integrity policies. The event handler
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Figure 3.2: Structure of a host.
converts events that contain new context information into corresponding facts and updates
the knowledge base; these events may be delivered by a context-dissemination service such
as Solar [27].

3.2

Proof object

The response to a query is a proof object represented as (pr , n, (value)Kr ), where pr is
a receiver principal. Figure 3.3 shows the grammar of a proof object. The proof object
contains a nonce n that is attached with the query to prevent replay attacks by an adversary
that is capable of intercepting the encrypted messages between principals. In the following
discussion, we omit the nonce field in the proof object for brevity.
The value is a query result, which is a boolean value (TRUE or FALSE), a conjunction of boolean values, or the value REJECT. The value REJECT is used when a given
query is not handled because the querier principal does not satisfy the handler principal’s
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< proof >
|

{z

::=

‘(’ < receiver > ‘, ’ < nonce > ‘, ’ < proofs > ‘)’

::=
::=
::=
::=
::=
::=
::=
::=
::=
::=
::=
::=

‘(’ < value pair > (∧ < value pair >) ∗ ‘)’ | ‘(’ < value > ‘)’
‘(’ < receiver > ‘, ’ < value > ‘)’
< string >
< atom >
< predicate > ‘(’ < args > ‘)’
< string >
< arg > (‘, ’ < arg >) ∗
< string >
‘TRUE ’ | ‘FALSE ’ | ‘REJECT ’
< number >
< number >< digit > | < digit >
0|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9

}

< proofs >
< value pair >
< receiver >
< query >
< atom >
< predicate >
< args >
< arg >
< value >
< nonce >
< number >
< digit >

Figure 3.3: Representation of a proof for the base case. The item value, shown with
bold fonts, is encrypted with a public key of a principal that receives the proof. The item
proof, shown with an underbrace, is digitally signed with a private key of a principal that
constructs a proof.
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confidentiality policies. Otherwise, the handler principal constructs a proof tree locally,
then includes the query’s result (TRUE or FALSE) in the proof object. (We name the returned object a proof object because, in the general case in Section 4, it contains a proof
tree that shows how the query result is derived.) The receiver principal pr might not be
the principal that issues query q (we explain why, below), and, therefore, the name of the
receiver principal needs to be included in the proof object, so that the receiver principal can
decrypt an encrypted value. As indicated with the notation (value)Kr , the value must be
encrypted with receiver principal pr ’s public key Kr to enforce the confidentiality policies
of the publisher principal. The public key encryption is performed to prevent intermediate
principals from reading the value. Furthermore, the whole proof object is transmitted via a
secure channel established with a session key between a querier and a handler principal to
prevent an eavesdropper from reading the content of the proof object. We assume that the
two principals share the symmetric key via a protocol using public-key operations when
the querier and handler principal authenticate with each other for the first time. The digital
signature of a whole proof signed by a handler principal ensures non-repudiability of the
handler; that is, the handler principal is not able to falsely deny later that it sent the proof.
A principal p0 that handles query q0 might issue subqueries to other principals, and the
returned proofs from those principals might contain encrypted query results that principal
p0 cannot decrypt. Therefore, the query q0 ’s result depends on the encrypted values in
the proofs for the subqueries that p0 issues, and principal p0 returns a proof for query q0
that contains the query results for the subqueries as follows. Suppose that principal p0
issues subqueries qi for i = 0, . . . , n − 1, and receives several pf i = (pr(i) , (value i )Kr(i) )
where pr(i) is the receiver principal of the proof, value i is the query qi ’s result, and Kr(i) is
principal pr(i) ’s public key. The query q0 ’s result is TRUE only if p0 can verify that value i
is TRUE for all i in the proof. If any pf i that principal p0 can decrypt contains a FALSE
value, p0 returns a simple proof (pr , (FALSE )Kr ), where pr is a receiver principal chosen
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by p0 . Otherwise, if there are some subproofs that p0 cannot decrypt (because r(i) 6= 0),
then principal p0 returns the proof (pr , (∧i (pr(i) , (value i )Kr(i) ))Kr ) for all r(i) 6= 0, as a
response to query q0 . We do not need to include the digital signatures of the embedded
subproofs in the proof, because a digital signature is only used to ensure non-repudiability
of the principal that sends the whole proof. In Section 4.1, a digital signature is also used to
check the authenticity of a subproof in a whole proof. The proof contains the concatenated
subproofs encrypted with public key Kr . The query result of the proof is TRUE if the
conjunction of all the value i (i.e., ∧i (value i )) is TRUE.

3.3

Decomposition of a proof tree

When a querier issues a query to a principal that satisfies the querier’s integrity policies for
that query, the principal that handles the query only returns a proof that contains the query’s
result (TRUE, FALSE, or REJECT), and the proof tree that derives the query’s result does
not have to be disclosed to the querier. If multiple principals are involved in processing
a query, no single principal obtains all the rules and facts in the proof tree of the original
query. Instead, the proof tree for the query is decomposed into multiple subtrees evaluated
by different principals in a distributed environment. In other words, there is no single
principal that maintains a whole proof; instead, each principal maintains a subproof of the
whole proof.
Figure 3.4 describes such collaboration between a querier and a handler hosts. Suppose that host A run by principal Alice, who owns a projector, receives an authorization
query ?grant(Dave, projector ) that asks whether Dave is granted access to that projector.
Since Alice’s authorization policy in her knowledge base refers to a requester’s location
(i.e., location(P, room112 )), Alice issues a query ?location(Dave, room112 ) to host B
run by Bob. Alice chooses Bob, because Bob satisfies Alice’s integrity policies for queries
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Confidentiality policies

Integrity policies

acl(location(P, L)) = {Alice}

trust(location(P, L)) = {Bob}
?grant(Dave, projector)

?location(Dave, room112)

Engine

PSfrag replacements

Engine

TRUE

location(P, L):- owner(P, D), location(D, L)
grant(P, projector):- location(P, room112)

owner(Dave, pda15)
location(pda15, room112)

Knowledge base

Knowledge base

Host A (Alice)

Host B (Bob)

Figure 3.4: Remote query between two principals. Alice is a principal that owns a projector,
and Bob is a principal who runs a location server. We only show a query result in Bob’s
reply, omitting other fields.
that matches a rule pattern location(P, L) as defined in her integrity policies. Bob processes the query from Alice, because Alice similarly satisfies Bob’s confidentiality policies for queries that matches a rule pattern location(P, L). Bob derives that Dave is in
room112 from the location of his device using the facts location(pda15 , room112 ) and
owner (Bob, pda15 ). However, he only needs to return a query result T RU E that states
that location(Dave, room112 ) is true, because Alice believes Bob’s statement about people’s location (i.e., location(P, L)) according to her integrity policies 1 .
The proof of the query is thus decomposed into two subproofs maintained by Alice and
Bob respectively. Alice’s proof contains only a root node that states location(Dave, room112 )
is true, and Dave’s proof consists of a root node that contains the rule and two leaf nodes
that contain owner (Dave, pda15 ) and location(pda15 , room112 ). In general, Bob could
return a proof tree that contains multiple nodes. If Alice only trusts Bob’s rule that derives
Bob’s location instead of Bob’s fact, he would need to submit a larger proof tree to satisfy
Alice’s integrity policies as we discuss in Chapter 4.
1

In the real world, Dave might lose his device or leave it in his office momentarily, and, as a result, Bob
incorrectly reports Dave’s location to Alice. However, Alice is responsible for deciding whether she should
believe location information from Bob, and how Alice finds trustworthy principals is out of the scope of our
thesis.
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Query q0
Principal p0

Proof tree T0
Node n0

q1
p1

PSfrag replacements

Proof tree T1
n1

q2
p2

Proof tree T2

Figure 3.5: Decomposed proof tree. Principals p0 ,p1 ,and p2 construct a proof tree for query
q0 in a distributed way. Nodes n0 and n1 are leaf nodes of proof trees T0 and T1 respectively.
Principal p0 that handles query q0 issues query q1 to principal p1 to obtain the fact in node
n0 , and principal p1 similarly issues query q2 to principal p2 .
In general, a proof could be decomposed into sub-proofs maintained by multiple principals. Figure 3.5 shows that the proof tree for query q0 is constructed by principal p0 , p1 , and
p2 in a distributed way. Principal p0 receives query q0 and issues subquery q1 to principal
p1 to construct a proof tree T0 , and principal p1 similarly issues query q2 to principal p2 to
construct a proof tree T1 . The facts or rules in the proof trees T0 , T1 , and T2 are not disclosed to other principals; the result of evaluating each proof tree is returned to the querier
as a boolean value or conjunction of encrypted boolean values.

Example.

Figure 3.6 shows the proofs in the evaluation of the query ?grant(bob), involv-

ing p1 , p2 and p3 . The query ?grant(bob) from principal p0 to p1 is decomposed into two
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Security policies

p0

(p0 , T RU E)
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trust(grant(P )) = {p1 }

?grant(bob)

Knowledge base / Security policies

p1

ctor) ∧ location(P, hospital)

(p1 , T RU E)
?role(bob, doctor)

rule1 ≡ grant(P ) ← role(P, doctor) ∧ location(P, hospital)
trust(role(P, doctor)) = {p2 }
trust(location(P, L)) = {p3 }
(p1 , T RU E)
?location(bob, hospital)

p3

p2
Knowledge base
role(bob, doctor)

Knowledge base
location(bob, hospital)

Figure 3.6: The solid arrows are labeled with queries and the dashed arrows are labeled
with returned proofs. The rounded rectangles with dotted lines represent the knowledge
bases and security policies of those principals respectively.
sub-queries ?role(bob, doctor ) and ?location(bob, hospital ) according to the rule rule 1 ≡
grant(X) ← role(X, doctor ) ∧ location(X, hospital ), and those subqueries are handled
by principal p2 and p3 respectively. Principal p2 has the matching fact role(bob, doctor )
in its knowledge base and returns the proof (p1 , TRUE ) to principal p1 . Principal p3 also
returns the proof (p1 , TRUE ). Principal p1 trusts the integrity of the proofs from p2 and p3
according to its integrity policies, and internally constructs the proof tree that contains the
rule rule 1 as a root node and the facts role(bob, doctor ) and location(bob, hospital ) as its
children nodes. Principal p1 concludes that the statement grant(bob) is true and returns the
proof (p0 , TRUE ).
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3.4

Enforcement of confidentiality policies

The enforcement of each principal’s confidentiality policies is different from that in many
existing authorization systems, which check the privileges of a requester principal before
divulging information directly to the requester. In our system, a principal that publishes a
proof chooses the receiver of the proof from a list of upstream principals in the whole proof
tree; a query is appended with an ordered list of upstream principals that could receive the
query result. Therefore, it is possible to obtain an answer for a query even when a querier
principal does not satisfy the handler principal’s confidentiality policies. The principal
may make that choice because its confidentiality policy does not allow it to divulge the
information to the querier, but may allow the information to be released to another principal
further up the tree. The encrypted result will become part of the querier’s response up the
tree; eventually the receiver principal may decrypt the result and compute the conjunction
to see whether the tree is true.
We formally define the ordered list of upstream principals as follows. We say that
a principal represents a proof-tree node when a rule or a fact contained in that node is
published by that principal. We denote the principal that represents node n as rep(n), and
the ordered list of principals that represent a corresponding ordered list of nodes s as rep(s).
Suppose that principal p represents a node n in a proof tree. We denote the ordered list of
nodes on the path from the root of the proof tree to n, excluding n, as upstream nodes(n).
That is, the nodes are ordered from the root node downward.
The list of upstream principals for p is defined as rep(upstream nodes(n)), which we
denote as receivers(p) for brevity, in the case of a specific tree. In Figure 3.7, principal p0 ’s
issuing query q0 causes principals p1 and p2 to issue subqueries q1 , q2 and q3 . Principal p3 ’s
list receivers(p3 ) is < p0 , p1 , p2 >, for example.
When a publisher principal chooses a receiver from the list receivers(p), the receiver

27

PSfrag replacements

(q2 , < p0 , p1 , p2 >)
p3
pf3 ≡ (p0 , (value3 )K0 )
(q0 , < p0 >)
p0

(q1 , < p0 , p1 >)
p1

pf1 ≡ (p0 , pf3 )

p2
pf2 ≡ (p1 , ((pf3 )(pf4 ))K1 )
(q3 , < p0 , p1 , p2 >)
p4
pf4 ≡ (p1 , (value4 )K1 )

Figure 3.7: Principal p0 ’s query q0 is handled by principals p1 , p2 , p3 , and p4 in a distributed
way. Principal pi handles query qi−1 , and returns the proof pfi , for i = 1 to 4. Each query
is attached with an ordered list of upstream principals.
must satisfy the following two conditions. First, it must satisfy the publisher’s confidentiality policies. For example, suppose that principal p4 chooses p1 as the receiver of query q3 ’s
result. Principal p1 must satisfy p4 ’s confidentiality policies for query q3 ; that is, p4 must
have a confidentiality policy (rp, t) where rule pattern rp matches query q3 and principal
p1 belongs to a set of principals t.
Second, the receiver principal must satisfy the constraints due to recursive encryption
of a proof at each principal. A principal that handles a query might issue subqueries to
other principals. If that principal cannot decrypt the query results in those subproofs, it
includes the subproofs into its proof and encrypts them with the public key of a receiver
principal. This recursive encryption is necessary to prevent an untrusted intermediate principal on the path towards the receiver from knowing the query result by decrypting some
subproof whose query result is FALSE. Because such embedded encrypted subproofs are
encrypted recursively by intermediate principals until they reach their receiving principals,
the intermediate principals have to make sure that their encryption on embedded subproofs
are decrypted when the proof reaches the receiving principals of the subproofs. Otherwise,
the embedded subproofs pass the receiving principals without being decrypted, and the

28

proof fails.
In Figure 3.7, principal p3 chooses p0 as the receiver of proof pf3 ≡ (p0 , (value 3 )K0 )
where value 3 is query q2 ’s result and K0 is p0 ’s public key, and p4 chooses p1 as the receiver
of proof pf4 . Principal p2 embeds those proofs from p3 and p4 into proof pf 2 , because p2
cannot decrypt those proofs but knows that the query result for query q1 is the conjunction
of the query results in those encrypted proofs. Suppose that both principal p0 and p1 in
receivers(p2 ) satisfy the first condition; they satisfy p2 ’s confidentiality policies for query
q1 . Principal p2 must choose p1 as the receiver to satisfy the second condition. Notice
that principal p2 encrypts the proofs from principals p3 and p4 with principal p1 ’s public
key. This recursive encryption is necessary to prevent an attack by malicious upstream
principals as we discuss in Section 3.4.
When principal p1 decrypts and evaluates the proof pf4 , if the result is true then p1 only
embeds pf 3 into proof pf 1 , which is decrypted by principal p0 ; otherwise, p2 drops the
proof pf 3 and return a proof that contains a FALSE value. If principal p2 chooses p0 as the
receiver of proof pf 2 instead, the proof pf 4 , which is embedded in proof pf 2 , is forwarded
to p0 without being decrypted by p1 and the proof is not usable by p0 .
In general, a proof contains any number of encrypted subproofs. Suppose that principal
pi ’s list receivers(pi ) is < p0 , . . . , pi−1 >, and pi returns proof pf i that contains subproofs
pf j for j = 0, . . . , n−1 to principal pk . Let pr(j) be the receiver principal for proof pf j , and
index (p, s) be the function that returns p’s index in the ordered list s. The second condition
for selecting a receiver is stated as follows.

∀j ((index (pr(j) , receivers(pi )) ≤ index (pk , receivers(pi ))) ∨ (r(j) = i))

If there is more than one principal that satisfies the above two conditions, principal pk
chooses the principal of the minimum index (closest to the root). This guideline is impor29

tant not to narrow the choices of the receivers made by the upstream principals. Note that
the proof fails if the path to the root does not permit these decryptions and validations; the
failure results because the integrity and confidentiality policies of the principals involved
will not allow the necessary information sharing. We, therefore, anticipate that an addition
of rules or policies by principals would increase the false negative rate of authorization
decisions.

Attack by colluding principals.

A principal must encrypt proofs from other principals

with the public key of a receiver principal when the proof to the receiver principal contains
those proofs, as we see in the example in Figure 3.7. This recursive encryption is necessary
to prevent an attack by colluding upstream principals that modify a receivers list attached
with a query.
We describe such an attack with an example in Figure 3.8. Suppose that principals
p1 and p2 are malicious colluding principals. When p1 issues a query q1 , p1 produces the
incorrect receivers list < p1 , p0 > instead of the correct list < p0 , p1 >. Another malicious
principal p2 issues a query q2 with the receivers list < p1 , p0 , p2 >; principal p2 just appends
itself at the end of the receivers list obtained from p1 . Principal p1 needs p2 ’s cooperation,
because if p2 is not a colluding principal, p2 detects p1 ’s modification because p1 is not at
the end of the receivers list. When principal p2 sends a query to p3 , p3 cannot detect that
the receivers list is incorrect because principal p2 operated legitimately with the exception
of overlooking p1 ’s incorrect receivers list.
Suppose that principal p3 chooses p0 as the receiver of p3 ’s proof, which contains proofs
obtained from principals p4 and p5 and that principals p4 and p5 choose principals p0 and
p1 as the receivers of their proofs respectively. If principal p3 does not encrypt the proofs
from p4 and p5 with p0 ’s public key, principal p1 , who receives those proofs before p0 does,
decrypts the proof from principal p5 . Principal p1 knows the query result for q2 without a
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p4
q3
p5
pf4 ≡ (p0 , (T RU E)K0 )
(q0 , < p0 >)
p0

(q1 , < p1 , p0 >)
p1

(q2 , < p1 , p0 , p2 >)
p2

pf3 ≡ (p1 , ((pf3 )(pf4 ))

p3
pf3 ≡ (p0 , ((pf3 )(pf4 ))
q4

p5

pf5 ≡ (p1 , (F ALSE)K1 )

Figure 3.8: Principals p1 and p2 are malicious colluding principals. Principal p1 produces
the incorrect receivers list with a query q1 . The elements ordered incorrectly in the receivers
list are shown with bold fonts. For brevity, we omit the receivers list for queries q3 and q4 .
legitimate privilege if p5 ’s proof contains a F ALSE value, because the result of q2 is the
conjunction of the values contained in the proofs from p4 and p5 . If p5 ’s proof contains a
T RU E value, p1 is still not sure about the query result, though.

3.5

Algorithms for the base case

Each host (run by some principal) provides an interface HANDLE R EMOTE Q UERY for handling a query from a remote host. It takes as parameters a query string q, a list of upstream principals receivers defined in Section 3.4, and a querier principal’s integrity policies i policies, as shown in Figure 3.9. The function

HANDLE R EMOTE Q UERY

calls the

function GENERATE P ROOF to obtain a proof.
Figure 3.10 shows the algorithm for the function

GENERATE P ROOF ,

run on principal

p1 ’s host to build a proof while enforcing confidentiality policies of the handler principal
p1 . The function takes several parameters: principal p0 that issues a query, principal p1 that
handles a query, a query string q, a nonce n, a list of upstream principals receivers for p1
(i.e., receivers(p1 )), p0 ’s integrity policies i policies 0 , p1 ’s integrity policies i policies 1 ,
p1 ’s confidentiality policies c policies 1 , and p1 ’s knowledge base KB1 . The querier prin31

Query
String query
Principal[] receivers
Hashtable i_policies

Querier
Proof

Handler

Figure 3.9: Query interface.
cipal p0 ’s integrity policies are provided to the function as a parameter for principal p1 to
avoid wasting effort by constructing a proof that does not satisfy the querier p0 ’s integrity
policies; a principal p0 later uses its integrity policies i policies 0 to check the integrity of a
proof returned from p1 .
If p0 is an initial querier, it includes itself into the list receivers.
Lines 2–3 check whether there is any principal in the list receivers that satisfies the
handler principal p1 ’s confidentiality policies. The principals that belong to the intersection
of receivers and the union of the access-control lists in p1 ’s confidentiality policies for
query q are eligible to receive a proof from p1 . We treat the ordered list receivers as a set in
line 2, and denote the result set as s. If there is no such principal (i.e., the set s is empty),
line 4 returns a proof with a REJECT value to querier principal p0 .
Line 5 sets the receiver principal of a proof in the case that the query result in the proof
is obtained locally. The chosen receiver is the principal that belongs to list s and has the
minimum index in the ordered list receivers. We choose that principal with the function
minIndex (s, receivers) in line 5. Let index (p, receivers) be the function that returns the
index of a principal p in the list receivers. We define minIndex (s, receivers) as the function
that returns a principal p that satisfies the following conditions.

p ∈ s ∧ ∀p0 | ((p0 ∈ s) ∧ (index (p, receivers) ≤ index (p0 , receivers)))
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We use the symbol ‘|’ to denote “such that” in our algorithm for brevity. Line 7 checks
whether the handler principal p1 satisfies the querier p0 ’s integrity policies. If not, line 8
returns a proof with a FALSE value to principal pr . Line 9 checks whether query q matches
fact f in p1 ’s knowledge base. If so, line 10 returns a proof with a TRUE value to principal
pr .
Lines 11–19 cover the case that query q matches the head of rule r in p1 ’s knowledge
base. Line 12 unifies query q and rule r ≡ A ← B1 , . . . , Bk , resulting in the instantiated
rule A0 ← B10 , . . . , Bk0 . Lines 13–14 obtain subproofs for the subqueries B10 , . . . , Bk0 iteratively. Line 15 sets the conjunction of all the subproofs into a variable pfs, and line 16
decrypts subproofs that can be decrypted by principal p1 by calling the function DECRYPTP ROOFS in Figure 3.11. The function

DECRYPT P ROOFS

constructs a proof that contains

subproofs that are not decrypted. If a proof is not constructed, it returns a NULL value.
When lines 7–18 fail to construct a proof that derives query q, our algorithm does
not return a proof that contains FALSE immediately. Instead, it tries to obtain a proof
from a remote principal in lines 21–32. Line 21 creates an empty set accessed that will
contain a set of remote principals. Line 22 appends p1 into the receivers list and sets it
into another ordered list rcvrs, using the function concat that appends a principal in the
second parameter into the list in the first parameter. The ordered list rcvrs is used as one
of the parameters for a remote query below. Lines 22–31 obtain a proof for query q from a
remote principal. Line 22 checks whether there is any principal pl that satisfies p1 ’s integrity
policies for query q and does not belong to the set accessed . The set accessed maintains
a list of principals to which the remote query is already issued. Line 23 calls the function
ISSUE R EMOTE Q UERY

with the remote principal pl , the query q, the nonce n, the ordered

list rcvrs, and the integrity policies i policies 1 as parameters, and that function returns a
proof from principal pl . Line 24 checks whether the proof contains the same nonce and
query given as parameters of the remote query, and line 25 checks whether principal p1
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is the receiver of that proof. Lines 26–28 handle the case that a set of proofspfs actually
contains just a value TRUE or FALSE. If that holds true, line 26 checks whether the proof
contains a TRUE value. If so, line 27 returns a proof that contains a TRUE value to principal
pr ; otherwise, it returns a proof that contains a FALSE value similarly. Line 29 decrypts
the proof by calling the function DECRYPT P ROOFS. If the returned proof pf 0 is not NULL,
line 31 returns that proof; otherwise, line 32 puts principal pl into the set accessed . This
process is iterated until the while loop in lines 22–32 obtains a proof or finishes trying all
the remote principals. Finally, line 33 returns a proof with a FALSE value, since there is no
other way to construct a proof for query q.

Algorithm for decrypting a set of proofs.

Figure 3.11 shows the algorithm for decrypt-

ing a set of proofs obtained from remote principals. The function DECRYPT P ROOFS takes
as parameters a principal pc whose private key is used to decrypt the proofs, a set of proofs
pfs obtained from remote principals, a default receiver principal chosen by principal pc , and
a set of principals s to whom principal pc could send a proof, and the ordered list receivers.
Line 1 checks whether the format of the proofs pfs is valid, and line 2 checks whether
all the subproofs that can be decrypted by principal pc contains a TRUE value. If that holds
true, line 3 returns a proof with a TRUE value to principal pr . Line 4 checks whether all the
subproofs decrypted by pc contain a TRUE value, and if so, line 5 checks whether there is
some principal pr0 that satisfies the constraint due to the recursive encryption we describe
in Section 3.4; that is, pr0 ’s index in the ordered list receivers must be greater than or equal
to the index of pr(i) in receivers if r(i) 6= 1. If there is such a principal pr0 , line 6 returns
a proof containing the subproofs whose values could not be decrypted by p1 with principal
pr0 as the recipient. If all the above attempts to return a proof, line 7 returns a NULL value,
which means that the function fails to return a proof.
We extend the algorithms in this section to support the general case in Section 4.5 and
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GENERATE P ROOF (p0 , p1 , q, n, receivers, i

1
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4
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22
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27
28
29
30
31
32
33

policies0 , i policies1 , c policies1 , KB 1 )

 Check whether there
S is any principal in receivers that satisfies p1 ’s confidentiality policies.
s ← receivers ∩ ( i ti ) for all policies (rpi , ti ) ∈ c policies1 where rpi matches q
if s = ∅  if set s is empty.
then return (p0 , n, (REJECT )K0 )
pr ← minIndex(s, receivers)
 Check whether principal p1 satisfies querier p0 ’s integrity policies.
if ¬(∃ policy p = (rp, t) | ((p ∈ i policies0 ) ∧ (rp matches q) ∧ (p1 ∈ t)))
then return (pr , n, (FALSE )Kr )
if ∃ fact f | ((f ∈ KB 1 ) ∧ (f matches q))
then return (pr , n, (TRUE )Kr )
elseif ∃ rule r ≡ A ← B1 , . . . , Bk | ((r ∈ KB 1 ) ∧ (A matches q))
then unify q and A ← B1 , . . . , Bk , resulting in A0 ← B10 , . . . , Bk0
for i ← 1 to k
do pf i ← GENERATE P ROOF(p1 , p1 , Bi0 , receivers, i policies1 , i policies1 , c policies1 , KB 1 )
where pf i = (pr(i) , (valuei )Kr(i) ), and r(i) is the receiver principal of pf i
pfs ← ∧n1 pf i
pf ← DECRYPT P ROOFS(p1 , pfs, pr , s, receivers)
if pf 6= NULL
then return pf
 If we fail to construct a proof that derives the query locally, we try to obtain a proof from a remote principal.
accessed ← ∅
rcvs ← concat(receivers, p1 )
while ∃ principal pl ((pl ∈
/ accessed) ∧ ∃ policy p = (rp, t) ((p ∈ i policies1 ) ∧ (rp matches q) ∧ (pl ∈ t)))
do pf ← ISSUE R EMOTE Q UERY(pl , q, n, rcvs, i policies1 ) where pf = (pr0 , q 0 , n0 , (pfs K1 )
if q = q 0 ∧ n = n0
then if pr0 = p1
then if pf s = TRUE
then return (pr , n, (TRUE )Kr )
else return (pr , n, (FALSE )Kr )
else pf 0 ← DECRYPT P ROOFS(p1 , pfs, pr , s, receivers)
if pf 0 6= NULL
then return pf 0
else accessed ← accessed ∪ {pl }
return (pr , n, (FALSE )Kr )

Figure 3.10: Algorithm for generating a proof.
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DECRYPT P ROOFS(pc , pfs, pr , s, receivers)

1 if pf s = ∧n1 pfi where pfi = (pr(i) , vali )
2
then if ∀i ((pfi = (pc , (vali )Kc )) ∧ (vali = TRUE ))
3
then return (pr , (TRUE )Kr )
4
elseif ∀i ((pf i = (pr(i) , (valuei )Kr(i) )) ∧ (((r(i) 6= c) ∨ ((r(i) = c) ∧ (valuei = TRUE ))))
5
then if ∃ pr0 | (∀i (((pr0 ∈ s) ∧ (index(pr(i) , receivers) ≤ index(pr0 , receivers)) ∧ (r(i) 6= c))
∨(r(i) = 1)))
6
then return (pr0 , (∧i pf i )Kr0 )
for all i where pf i = (pr(i) , (valuei )Kr(i) ) ∧ (r(i) 6= c)
7 else return NULL

Figure 3.11: Algorithm for decrypting a set of proofs.
provide the correctness proof in Section 4.6.

3.6

Example application

Consider again our initial example of an incident management system (IMS) shown in Figure 2.1; a centralized server would produce the proof tree in Figure 2.2. Figure 3.12 shows
how user bob (principal p0 ) requests images from the surveillance camera image server
managed by the airport (principal p1 ).

Bob’s request is handled by multiple principals

p1 , p2 , . . . , p7 . In Figure 3.12, every principal issues queries to the principals that satisfy
its integrity policies, and every querier except for principal p2 satisfies the confidentiality policies of the principals to which it sends the queries. Principal p2 does not satisfy
p4 ’s confidentiality policies for query ?location(bob, airport), because p2 is temporarily
assigned to manage the role server for the incident, and thus principal p4 does not establish
a long-term trust relation with principal p2 . Fortunately, p1 that runs the surveillance camera image server satisfies p4 ’s confidentiality policies, principal p4 encrypts the query result
with p1 ’s public key, and principal p2 embeds p4 ’s proof into its own proof, then returns it
to p1 . Principal p1 decrypts the query result in the proof from p2 , but it is not aware of the
fact that the query result is created by principal p4 .
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p0

?grant(bob)

p1

grant(P ) ← role(P, operation chief )

?role(bob, operation chief )
(p1 , (p1 , (T RU E)K1 ))

p8

role(P, operation chief )
← role(P, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(P, airport)

p2

acl(role(P, R)) = {p1 }

?role(bob, police chief, police dept)

?location(bob, airport)

(p2 , (T RU E)K2 )

role(bob, police chief, police dept)
acl(role(P, R, police dept)) = {p1 , p2 }

(p1 , (T RU E)K1 )

p3
?owner(bob, pda15)

owner(bob, pda15)
acl(owner(P, D)) = {p4 }

location(P, L) ← owner(P, D) ∧ location(D, L)
owner(bob, pda15)
acl(location(P, L)) = {p1 }

p4

?location(pda15, L)

(p4 , (T RU E)K4 )

(p4 , (T RU E)K4 )

p5

p6

location(D, L) ← in(A, L) ∧ wif i(D, A)
in(ap39, airport)
acl(location(D, L)) = {p4 }

?wif i(pda15, ap39)
(p6 , (T RU E)K6 )

p7

wif i(pda15, ap39)
acl(wif i(D, L)) = {p6 }

Figure 3.12: Example of an emergency response system. Principal p0 is a first responder
whose role is “operation chief”. Principal p1 represents a surveillance camera image server.
Principal p2 is the role membership server of an incident management system (IMS). Principal p3 is the role membership server of a police department. Principal p4 represents a
location-tracking service. The arrows represent the flow of queries among the principals.
Each arrow is labeled with a query and a returned proof. The query is shown above the
dashed line; the proof is shown below the line. Each principal’s rules, facts and confidentiality policies are shown in a dashed rectangle.
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Chapter 4
Secure distributed proof system for the
general case
In this chapter, we extend our proof system so that it supports confidentiality and integrity
policies on rules as well as on facts. A proof contains a proof tree that describes the derivation of the query’s result if the evaluation of a query is true, instead of simply the result
TRUE, in order to satisfy a querier principal’s integrity policies. This situation occurs when
the querier principal does not trust the integrity of the query result from the handler principal, but trusts handler’s rule that is used to decompose the query into subqueries. We first
describe the representation of a proof that contains a proof tree and then explain how the
enforcement mechanisms for confidentiality and integrity policies should be extended to
support policies on rules. Finally, we give an extended algorithm that supports a proof that
contains a proof tree and provide its soundness proof.
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4.1

Representation of a proof

We represent a proof using nested parentheses based on the grammar in Figure 4.1. A proof
contains five fields: a sender principal, a receiver principal, a query, a nonce, and a proof
tree optionally encrypted for a receiver. The sender is the principal that publishes a proof,
and the receiver is the intended receiver of the proof. The query is a query string for which
the proof is constructed, the nonce is a random number chosen by a querier principal, and
the proof tree represents how the evaluation result for the query is derived.
The hierarchical structure of a proof tree is built by embedding subproofs into a proof
recursively. That is, the proof contains a proof tree that consists of a root node (representing
a rule) of the proof tree and the subproofs that contain the subproof trees under the root
node. Therefore, each node in a proof tree described in Section 2.2 has a corresponding
proof (or an embedded subproof) that contains it as the root node of its proof tree. If a
proof contains a single-node proof tree, it only contains a query result or a set of proofs
whose query results are encrypted as described in Section 3.4. The digital signature of a
proof is attached with the proof as in the basic case in Chapter 3, but the main purpose is
to check the integrity of a proof that contains subproofs produced by multiple principals.
The digital signature also ensures non-repudiability of the sender principal. If a query
result depends on encrypted values, it is represented as a set of value pairs that consist of a
receiver principal and an encrypted query result, as we describe in Section 4.6.
The first four fields in a proof are necessary to verify the integrity of its proof tree.
The sender’s identity is necessary to check the authenticity of a proof by checking a digital
signature attached with the proof. To verify a proof, one must verify the integrity of all the
embedded subproofs in that proof, which are published by different principals. Therefore,
every principal that publishes the subproof needs to attach a digital signature with it. We
omit the digital signature of a proof from our syntax in Figure 4.1 for brevity. The receiver’s
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< proofs > ::= < proof > (< proof >) ∗
< proof > ::= ‘(’ < sender >, < receiver >, < query >, < nonce >, < proof tree > ‘)’
< proof tree > ::= ‘(’ < rule cert >, ‘(’ < proofs > ‘)’‘)’ | < proofs > | < value pairs >
| < value >
< sender > ::= < identifier >
< receiver > ::= < identifier >
< query > ::= < atom >
< atom > ::= < predicate > ‘(’ < args > ‘)’
< predicate > ::= < identifier >
< args > ::= < arg > (, < arg >) ∗
< arg > ::= < identifier >
< nonce > ::= < number >
< rule cert > ::= ‘(’ < rule >, < signer > ‘)’
< rule > ::= < head > ← < body >
< head > ::= < atom >
< body > ::= < atom > (∧ < atom >) ∗
< signer > ::= < identifier >
< value pairs > ::= < value pair > (< value pair >) ∗
< value pair > ::= ‘(’ < receiver >, < value > ‘)’
< value > ::= ‘TRUE ’ | ‘FALSE ’ | ‘REJECT ’
< identifier > ::= < string >
< string > ::= < string >< character > | < character >
< character > ::= a| . . . |z|A| . . . |Z|0|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9
< number > ::= < number >< digit > | < digit >
< digit > ::= 0|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9

Figure 4.1: Grammar for a proof. A sender principal attaches a digital signature with its
publishing proof, and optionally encrypts the proof tree field of a proof. We, however,
omit the digital signatures and encryptions from our syntax. The major differences from
the grammar in Figure 3.3 is that a proof has the sender field and that the proof contains a
proof tree instead of a boolean value.
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identity is necessary when a proof tree is encrypted by the receiver’s public key as we
discuss in Section 3.4. The nonce is necessary to prevent a malicious principal from reusing
a proof for an identical query at an earlier time.
When we verify the integrity of the query result in a proof, we check the principal that
signs the proof. However, when we also verify the integrity of a rule in a proof, we check
the principal that defines that rule. That principal may be different from the one that applies
the rule to handle a query. Therefore, the rule is paired with the principal that defines it
so that the principal that receives a proof can obtain the digitally signed certificate of that
rule separately to check the integrity of the rule. For example, if principal p0 issues a
query to p1 and obtains a proof that contains a rule r from p1 . However, that rule could be
actually defined by another principal p2 specified in the signer field of the derivation rule for
rule cert in Figure 4.1. Principal p0 can check the authenticity of the rule by downloading
a certificate that p2 signed on the rule.

Example.

The example in Figure 4.2 is a modification of Figure 3.6. Principal p0 has

different integrity policies, and, as a result, principal p1 returns a proof that contains a
proof tree. Principal p0 does not trust the integrity of p1 to evaluate the query ?grant(bob),
but does trust the integrity of rule 1 . Principal p1 constructs a proof that consists of the
rule rule1 as a root node and the sub-proofs proof 2 and proof 3 as leaf nodes and returns it to principal p0 . The proof tree constructed by principal p1 is trusted by principal p0 because principal p0 trusts rule 1 in principal p1 and the facts role(bob, doctor ) and
location(bob, hospital ) in principals p2 and p3 respectively, according to its integrity policies. The proofs proof 2 and proof 3 embedded in proof proof 1 must be attached with the
digital signatures signed by principals p2 and p3 so that principal p0 can check their authenticity.
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Security policies
trust(grant(P ) ← role(P, doctor) ∧ location(P, hospital)) = {p 1 }
trust(role(P, doctor)) = {p2 }
trust(location(P, L)) = {p3 }

p0
PSfrag replacements

?grant(bob)

proof1 ≡ (p1 , p0 , ?grant(bob), (rule1 , (proof2 , proof3 )))

Knowledge base
rule1 ≡ grant(P ) ← role(P, doctor) ∧ location(P, hospital)

p1
proof2 ≡ (p2 , p1 , ?role(bob, doctor), T RU E)
?role(bob, doctor)

proof3 ≡ (p3 , p1 , ?location(bob, hospital), T RU E)
?location(bob, hospital)

Knowledge base

Knowledge base

p2

p3

role(bob, doctor)

location(bob, hospital)

Figure 4.2: Construction of a proof tree. The solid arrows are labeled with queries and the
dashed arrows are labeled with returned proof trees. The rounded rectangles with dotted
lines represent the knowledge bases or security policies of those principals respectively.
We omit nonce and digital signatures in the proofs for brevity.

4.2

Decomposition of proof trees

In the general case, a response to a query is a proof that contains a proof tree that satisfies
the integrity policies of a querier. If the integrity of the principal that handles a query is
trusted by the querier, it only returns a single-node proof tree that contains a query result.
If there are such principals participating in evaluating a query, the whole proof tree is
decomposed into several subtrees and is evaluated by those principals in a distributed way.
The facts and rules used for evaluating a subtree do not have to be disclosed to a querier
principal.
In Figure 4.3, principals p0 , p1 , . . . , p10 are the participants in evaluating a query, and
each arrow shows how a proof tree flows from one principal to another. We show only the
fields for a sender and a receiver principals for brevity, omitting other fields. The dashed
lines show which principal’s integrity policies are applied to the principals enclosed in the
lines. Because principal p0 trusts principal p2 and p3 in terms of the integrity of the given
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p0
(p1 , p0 , ((p3 , p1 ), (p4 , p1 )))

p0 ’s integrity policies

(p2 , p0 )

p1

p11
p12
p13

(p3 , p0 )

(p4 , p0 )

p7

(p5 , p2 )

p4

p3
(p7 , p3 )

p2

(p6 , p2 , ((p9 , p2 ), (p10 , p2 )))

p5

(p8 , p3 )

p8

p3 ’s integrity policies

p6
(p9 , p2 )

(p10 , p2 )

p9

p10

p2 ’s integrity policies

Figure 4.3: Example of subproofs. Principals p0 , . . . , p10 are the participants in evaluating
a query. Each arrow shows how a proof tree flows from one principal to another. Each
arrow is labeled with the pair of a sender and a receiver principals in a proof, omitting
the other fields of the proof for brevity. The dashed lines show which principal’s integrity
policies are applied to the principals enclosed in the lines. The principals p0 , p2 , and p3 that
represent the root node of the nested subtrees are enclosed in the thick rectangles.
queries; it is possible to evaluate the query at p0 , p2 , and p3 rather than collecting all the
rules and facts at p0 . Principals p2 and p3 construct a proof tree locally based on their
own integrity policies, and return only a single-node proof tree that contains a query result.
Therefore, principal p0 does not know how the query results from p2 and p3 are derived.
A principal that issues a query attaches its local or a upstream principal’s integrity policies
with the query so that those policies are shared with downstream principals as we explain
in Section 4.5.
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4.3

Enforcement of confidentiality policies

We apply the same mechanism for enforcing confidentiality policies as in Section 3.4. The
only difference is that a receiver principal must be an upstream principal that evaluates a
proof subtree. We, therefore, define a set of principals receivers(p) whose members are
eligible to receive principal p’s proof as follows.
Suppose that in a proof tree there is a sequence of nodes n0 , n1 , . . . , nk on the path
from the root n0 to node nk in the proof tree, and principal pi represents node ni and
handles query qi−1 from pi−1 for i = 1 to k. Principal pi where i < k belongs to the set
receivers(pk ) if it satisfies either of the following two conditions.
• Principal pi is p0 .
• There exists principal pl that belongs to receivers(pk ), pl has an integrity policy
(rp, t) such that rule pattern rp matches query qi−1 and pi belongs to the set of principals t (i.e., trust(rp)), and there is no other principal pj (where l < j < i), that
satisfies this condition.

Example.

We explain the above definition of receivers(pk ) with an example in Fig-

ure 4.4. Suppose that principal p0 issues a query ?grant(Bob) to p1 , and principal p1 and
p2 issue subsequent queries ?role(Bob, doctor ) and ?location(Bob, hospital ) respectively.
We decide the members of receivers(p3 ) as follows. Since principal p0 satisfies the first
condition, principal p0 belongs to receivers(p3 ). Next, we consider the second condition.
Principal p0 defines an integrity policy p2 ∈ trust 0 (role(P, R)) (i.e., (role(P, R), {p2 })).
The rule pattern role(P, R) of the integrity policy matches query role(Bob, hospital ) that
p2 handles, and p2 belongs to the trust list of the integrity policy. In addition, principal p1
does not belong to receivers(p3 ), because principal p0 only trusts p1 ’s rule that is used to
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?role(Bob, doctor)
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?location(Bob, hospital)
p2

p3

p1 ∈ trust0 (grant(P ) :- role(P, R))
p2 ∈ trust0 (role(P, R))

Integrity policies

Figure 4.4: Example of a receivers list.
handle p0 ’s query. Therefore, principal p2 satisfies the second condition, and two principals
p0 and p2 belong to receivers(p3 ).
Notice that our new definition does not change the definition of receivers(p) in Section 3.4, because every principal issues a query to a principal that it trusts in terms of the
integrity of evaluating the query. That is, if a querier principal pi−1 in receivers(p) issues
query qi−1 to pi , pi belongs to receivers(p) as well because pi satisfies the second condition
above. In other words, all the upstream principals of p belong to the set receivers(p).

4.4

Hybrid encryption

When our system performs a public-key encryption, it first generates a symmetric key
randomly and encrypts a proof with that symmetric key. We only use a public key to
encrypt the symmetric key. To decrypt a proof, the system first decrypts the symmetric key
with the receiver’s private key and then decrypts the proof with that symmetric key.

4.5

Algorithms

Each host provides the same remote interface for handling a remote query. We describe
the extended version of the function
CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY

GENERATE P ROOF ,

and then introduce the function

that checks the integrity of a proof tree that contains rules as
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intermediate nodes.

Algorithm for constructing a proof.

In Figure 4.6, we extend the algorithm in Fig-

ure 3.10 to support security policies on rules. There are a few modifications as follows.
First, a proof has additional fields such as a sender principal, a query string, and a nonce
according to the representation of a proof in Section 4.1. We use the parameter names rcvrs,
i pol 0 , i pol 1 , and c pol 1 instead of receivers, i policies 0 , i policies 1 , and c policies 1 respectively for compactness.
Second, the algorithm handles a proof from a remote principal that contains multiple
subproofs. The query result of the proof is the conjunction of the query results of all the
embedded subproofs. The query result is TRUE if all the query results of the embedded
subproofs have a TRUE value; otherwise, it is FALSE. Lines 15–19 construct a proof from
the proofs pfi for i = 1 to k obtained by calling the function GENERATE P ROOF in line 14.
Each proof pf i contains either a query result or multiple subproofs. Therefore, the query
result of the proof is the conjunction of the query results of proofs pf i for i = 1 to k, and,
if proof pf i contains multiple subproofs, its query result is represented as the conjunction
of those embedded subproofs. Line 15 checks whether the handler principal p1 can read all
the query results of proof pf i , and all the query results are a TRUE value. The query result
of the proof is TRUE if the proof contains a TRUE value or all the embedded subproofs
contains a TRUE value. If the condition in line 15 holds true, line 16 returns a proof with a
TRUE value. Line 17 handles the case that principal p1 cannot decrypt all the query results
in the proofs pf i for i = 1 to k and all the decrypted query results have a TRUE value. If so,
line 19 checks whether there is a principal pr0 that satisfies the constraint due to recursive
encryption. We need to consider all the receiver principals of the embedded subproofs as
well. If there exists such a principal pr0 , line 19 returns a proof that contains the subproofs
whose query results cannot be decrypted by principal p1 .
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GENERATE P ROOF (p0 , p1 , q, n, rcvrs, i

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17

18

19

20
21

pol0 , i pol1 , c pol1 , KB1 )

 Check whether
S there is any principal in rcvrs that satisfies p1 ’s confidentiality policies.
s ← rcvrs ∩ ( i ti ) for all policies (rpi , ti ) ∈ c pol1 where rpi matches q
if s = ∅  if set s is empty.
then return (p1 , p0 , q, n, (REJECT)K0 )
pr ← minIndex(s, rcvrs)
 Check whether principal p1 satisfies querier p0 ’s integrity policies.
if ∃ policy p = (rp, t) | ((p ∈ i pol0 ) ∧ (rp matches q) ∧ (p1 ∈ t))
then append p1 to rcvrs
if ∃ fact f | ((f ∈ KB1 ) ∧ (f matches q))
then return (p1 , pr , q, n, (TRUE)Kr )
elseif ∃ rule r ≡ A ← B1 , . . . , Bk | ((r ∈ KB1 ) ∧ (A matches q))
then unify q and A ← B1 , . . . , Bk , resulting in A0 ← B10 , . . . , Bk0
for i ← 1 to k
do pfi ← GENERATE P ROOF(p1 , p1 , Bi0 , n, rcvrs, i pol1 , i pol1 , c pol1 , KB1 )
where pfi = (ps(i) , pr(i) , Bi0 , n, (pti )Kr(i) ),
s(i) and r(i) are sender and receiver principals of pfi respectively.
if ∀i ((r(i) = 1) ∧ (((pti = vali ) ∧ (vali = TRUE))
∨((pti = ∧j (pr(i,j) , (valij )Kr(i,j) )) ∧ ∀j ((r(i, j) = 1) ∧ (valij = TRUE)))))
then return (p1 , pr , q, n, (TRUE)Kr )
elseif ∀i ((r(i) 6= 1) ∨ ((r(i) = 1) ∧ (((pti = vali ) ∧ (vali = TRUE))
∨ ((pti = ∧j (pr(i,j) , (valij )Kr(i,j) ))
∧(∀j ((r(i, j) 6= 1) ∨ ((r(i, j) = 1) ∧ (valij = TRUE))))))))
then if ∃ pr0 ((pr0 ∈ s) ∧ (∀i ((r(i) = 1) ∨ (((pti = vali )
∧(index(pr(i) , rcvrs) ≤ index(pr0 , rcvrs))) ∨ ((pti = ∧j (pr(i,j) , (valij )Kr(i,j) ))
∧(∀j ((r(i, j) = 1) ∨ (index(pr(i,j) , rcvrs) ≤ index(pr0 , rcvrs)))))))))
then return (p1 , pr0 , q, n, ((∧i (pr(i) , pti ))(∧ij (pr(i,j) , (ptij )Kr(i,j) )))Kr0 )
where ((pfi = (ps(i) , pr(i) , Bi0 , n, (pti )Kr(i) ) ∧ (r(i) 6= 1))
∨((r(i) = 0) ∧ (pti = ∧j (pr(i,j) , (valij )Kr(i,j) )) ∧ r(i, j) 6= 1))
 Return a proof with rules that satisfy principal p0 ’s integrity policies and p1 ’s confidentiality policies.
return GENERATE P ROOF W ITH RULES(p0 , p1 , q, n, rcvrs, i pol0 , i pol1 , c pol1 , KB1 )

Figure 4.5: Algorithm for generating a proof.
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We discuss the remaining algorithm in the separate function GENERATE P ROOF W ITH RULES that is called in line 21.
Third, we handle the case that principal p1 is not trusted by p0 in terms of the evaluation
of a query, but p1 ’s rule, which matches the query, is trusted by principal p0 , in lines 1–
7. Line 21 checks whether there is a rule R ≡ A ← B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bk in p1 ’s knowledge
base whose head A matches query q and querier principal p0 satisfies p1 ’s confidentiality
policies for rule R. If there is such rule R, line 2 checks whether querier p0 has an integrity
policy p = (rp0 , t0 ) that trusts the integrity of p1 ’s rule R. Line 3 unifies query q and rule
R resulting R0 ≡ A0 ← B10 , . . . , Bk0 . Lines 4–5 obtain the proofs for the atoms B10 , . . . , Bk0
iteratively. Line 6 checks whether there is a receiver principal pr0 in the set of principals
rcvrs that satisfies the constraints due to recursive encryption described in Section 3.4. If
that holds true, we return the proof that contains rule R0 as the root node of the proof tree,
and the proofs for B10 , . . . , Bk0 as the subproofs under the root node. The proof tree must
contain the proofs whose proof trees are decrypted by p1 to satisfy the receiver principal’s
integrity policies.
Fourth, when principal p1 tries to construct a proof by issuing a remote query, we need
to check whether querier principal p0 trusts the integrity of the query result from handler
principal p1 . Line 11 checks that condition by checking whether p1 belongs to rcvrs, because line 8 in the function

GENERATE P ROOF

appends p1 to rcvrs if the condition holds.

If that holds true, line 12 issues a remote query with p1 ’s integrity policies i pol 1 . That is,
p1 ’s integrity policies are applied to the succeeding queries. Line 13 checks the integrity of
the returned proof by calling the function CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY. The function returns
a pair of a boolean value (true or false) and a simplified proof as we explain below. If
the proof satisfies p1 ’s integrity policies, line 15 returns the proof returned by the function
CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY .

If p1 does not belong to rcvrs, line 17 issues a remote query

with principal p0 ’s integrity policies; that is, the querier principal’s integrity policies are ap48

GENERATE P ROOF W ITH RULES(p0 , p1 , q, n, rcvrs, i

pol0 , i pol1 , c pol1 , KB1 )

1 if (∃ rule R | ((R ∈ KB1 ) ∧ (R ≡ A ← B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bk ) ∧(A matches q)))
∧(∃ policy p | ((p ∈ c policies1 ) ∧ (p = (rp, t)) ∧ rp matches rule R)))
2
then if ∃ policy p0 = (rp0 , t0 ) | ((p0 ∈ i pol0 ) ∧ (rp0 matches R) ∧ (p1 ∈ t0 ))
3
then unify q and rule R resulting R0 ≡ A0 ← B10 , . . . , Bk0
4
for i ← 1 to k
5
do pfi ← GENERATE P ROOF(p1 , p1 , Bi0 , n, rcvrs, i pol0 , i pol1 , c pol1 , KB1 )
where pfi = (ps(i) , pr(i) , Bi0 , n, (pti )Kr(i) ), and
s(i) and r(i) are sender and receiver principals of pfi
6
if ∃pr0 ((pr0 ∈ s) ∧ (∀i (index(pr(i) , rcvrs) ≤ index(pr0 , rcvrs))))
7
then return (p1 , pr0 , q, n, ((R0 , pc ), ∧i pfi )Kr0 )
where pc is a signer principal of rule R
8  If we fail to construct a proof that derives the query locally,
 we try to obtain a proof from a remote principal.
9 accessed ← ∅
10 while ∃ principal pl that is capable of handling query q and does not belong to the set accessed
11
do if p1 ∈ rcvrs
12
then proof ← ISSUE R EMOTE Q UERY(pl , q, rcvrs, i pol1 )
13
(trusted, proof 0 ) ← CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY(p1 , q, n, proof, i pol1 )
14
if trusted
15
then return proof’
16
else accessed ← accessed ∪ {pl }
17
else proof ← ISSUE R EMOTE Q UERY(pl , q, rcvrs, i pol0 )
18
return proof
19 return (p1 , pr , q, n, (FALSE)Kr )

Figure 4.6: Algorithm for generating a proof that contains rules as intermediate nodes.
plied to the succeeding queries. Line 18 returns the proof returned by the function without
checking its integrity. In other words, only principals trusted by their querier principals in
terms of the integrity of their query results need to enforce their integrity policies on proofs
received from remote principals. Finally, line 19 returns a proof with a FALSE value, since
there is no other way to construct a proof for query q.

Algorithm for checking the integrity of a proof.

The function CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY

in Figure 4.7 checks whether a proof satisfies given integrity policies, based on the definition given in Section 2.4.1. It takes as parameters principal pc that checks the integrity
of the proof, query string q, nonce nc , proof pf, and pc ’s integrity policies i policiesc . The
function also converts the hierarchical proof tree in a proof into a flat one that contains
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encrypted query results in the leaf nodes; that is, all the intermediate nodes are removed
from the proof tree while checking the integrity of those nodes.
Line 1 checks whether nonce n in the proof pf is same as the nonce nc for the query.
We assume that the authenticity of the proof pf is also checked by checking the digital
signature attached with the proof in line 1. If that is not true, line 2 returns false with no
proof tree. Line 3 checks whether pc trusts the integrity of principal ps ’s evaluating query
q. If that holds true, line 4 returns true with the proof given as a parameter. Line 5 checks
whether principal pc can decrypt the proof (i.e., principal pr is a receiver principal of the
proof pf ) and reads rule R at the root of the proof tree. Notice that all the variables in rule R
is unified with some constants when the proof tree was constructed. Line 6 checks whether
rule r signed by principal pd satisfies pc ’s integrity policies. If that holds true, lines 7–
11 check whether all the proofs for the atoms of rule R satisfies pc ’s integrity policies
by calling the function

CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY

recursively. If all the proofs satisfy the

integrity policies, line 11 returns true with the proof that contains the concatenation of the
subproofs that correspond to the leaf nodes of the initial proof tree.
Notice that it is necessary for the principal that checks the integrity of a proof to be able
to read all the rules in the intermediate nodes of the proof tree.

4.6

Soundness of the algorithm

We show that our algorithm constructs a proof tree only if the confidentiality and integrity
policies of every participating principal are satisfied.1 We give the proof for the general case
below, which covers the basic case in Chapter 3 as its special case. We separate the proof
into two parts: the proof on confidentiality policies, and the proof on integrity policies.
1

The other way (completeness of the algorithm) does not hold, as we discuss in Section 8.1, and we leave
it as our future work.
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CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY (pc , q, nc , pf, i

1
2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

policiesc )

if ¬((pf = (ps , pr , q, n, (pt)Kr )) ∧ (nc = n))
then return (false, NULL)
if (∃ policy p = (rp, t) | ((p ∈ i policiesc ) ∧ (rp matches query q) ∧ (ps ∈ t)))
then return (true, pf)
elseif ((r = c) ∧ (pt = ((R, pd ), (∧ni=1 pfi ))
where R is a rule, pd is the signer principal of R, and pfi for i = 1 to n are subproofs.
then if ∃ policy p = (rp, t) | ((p ∈ i policiesc ) ∧ (rp matches rule R) ∧ (pd ∈ t)
∧(principal pc holds a valid digital signature for R signed by pd ))
where R ≡ A ← B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bk
then for i ← 1 to k
do (trust, pfi0 ) = CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY(pc , Bi , pfi , i policiesc )
if ¬trust
then return (false, NULL)
return (true, (pc , pc , q, n, (∧i pfi0 )Kc ))
else return (false, NULL)
else return (false, NULL)

Figure 4.7: Algorithm for checking proof integrity.

4.6.1

Proof for confidentiality policies

We prove that our algorithm constructs a proof tree only if the confidentiality policies of
every participating principal are satisfied by induction below.

Base case: We first show that our claim holds in the case of a single-node proof tree.
Suppose that principal p0 makes query q to principal p1 , and p1 , which does not issue any
subqueries, returns a proof whose proof tree only contains a root node. We only need
to show that p1 ’s confidentiality policies are satisfied, because p0 does not disclose any
information in its knowledge base to p1 . To satisfy p1 ’s confidentiality policies, p1 must
have a confidentiality policy (rp, t) such that rule pattern rp matches query q and p1 belongs
to the set t. The function GENERATE P ROOF in Figure 4.6 ensures this condition in line 3.
Therefore, principals p0 and p1 construct a proof only if their confidentiality policies are
satisfied.
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Case 2: Some intermediate principal pl belongs to the set receivers(pk ) as well.

Figure 4.8: Linear proof trees with and without an intermediate principal that belongs to the
set receivers(pk ). Black circles denote principals that belong to receivers(pk ), and white
circles denote principals that does not belong to receivers(pk ). Each circle is labeled with
a principal name, and each arrow is labeled with a query name.
Induction step: We next show that, if our claim holds for a proof tree whose depth is
less than k, then it also holds for a proof tree of depth k. (The base case above considers a
tree of depth 1.) Without loss of generality, we consider the case that a proof tree is linear.
Because our algorithm for enforcing confidentiality policies on each node depends only on
the nodes on the path from that node to the root in a proof tree; the node is not aware of the
existence of the nodes in other branches of the proof tree.
Suppose that there is a linear tree of depth k where nodes n0 , . . . , nk are ordered from
the root to the leaf. Let p0 , . . . , pk be the principals that represent nodes n0 , . . . , nk respectively, and q0 , . . . , qk−1 be the queries, where qi is the query by pi to pi+1 . When principal
p0 issues query q0 to p1 , we consider two cases in Figure 4.8. In case 1, only principal p0
belongs to a set of principals receivers(pk ) defined in Section 4.3. In case 2, there are some
other principals in the set receivers(pk ) besides principal p0 .
We first consider case 1. Because principal p1 does not belong to receivers(pk ), prin-
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cipal p2 cannot distinguish query q1 issued by principal p1 from q1 issued by principal p0
instead, because all the parameters in those queries are same in both cases; the set receivers
contains only principal p0 in both cases. The same can be observed for p2 , . . . , pk . In the
latter case, by the induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures that a proof tree for query
q1 is constructed by principals p2 , . . . , pk if their confidentiality policies are satisfied. Because principals p2 , . . . , pk do not distinguish the former case from the latter, our algorithm
ensures that their confidentiality policies are preserved in the former case as well. The
function

GENERATE P ROOF

in Figure 4.6 ensures principal p1 ’s confidentiality policies in

lines 3. Principal p0 ’s confidentiality policies are vacuously satisfied because p0 does not
disclose any information. We, therefore, prove that our algorithm ensures the confidentiality policies of the principals p0 , . . . , pk with a proof tree of depth k in case 1.
We next consider case 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that there is a single
principal pl in receivers(pk ) between principal p0 and pk . There are two subcases to be
considered. In the first, subcase 2a, principal pl can decrypt all the nodes nl+1 , . . . , nk in
the proof tree for query ql ; that is, principals pl+1 , . . . , pk choose pl as the receiver of their
returning proofs. Because principals pl+1 , . . . , pk do not choose p0 from receivers(pj ) =
{p0 , pl } for j = l + 1 to k as the receiver principal of their proofs respectively, their algorithm works in the same way as the case where the set receivers(pj ) = {pl } for j = l to k.
Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures the confidentiality policies
of pl+1 , . . . , pk . Because principal pl returns a proof with a single-node proof tree, principals p0 , . . . , pl−1 are not aware of the fact that principal pl issues query ql for handling
query ql−1 . Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures the confidentiality policies of p0 , . . . , pl−1 . Principal pl ’s confidentiality policies are also satisfied because
our algorithm for enforcing confidentiality policies on pl works in the same way as the case
that pl does not issue any subqueries and constructs a single-node proof tree responding to
query ql−1 , because there is no constraint on pl due to recursive encryption because pl can
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decrypt all the nodes in the proof from pl+1 to pk . Therefore, our claim holds for subcase 2a.
The second subcase 2b is that principal pl cannot decrypt some nodes in the proof
tree received from pl+1 . If principal pl cannot decrypt node nm between nl and nk (i.e.,
l < m < k), the proof tree does not satisfy pl ’s integrity policies, and the proof fails.
We, therefore, only consider the case that pl cannot decrypt leaf node nk only. When node
nk chooses p0 as a receiver principal, our algorithm for enforcing confidentiality policies
works for nodes n1 , . . . , nk−1 in the same way as the case that node nk is omitted (i.e.,
principal pk−1 does not issue query qk−1 to pk ) because pk ’s proof encrypted with principal
p0 ’s public key does not interfere with the processes of principals p1 , . . . , pk−1 for choosing
a receiver principal of their proofs from the set receivers = {p0 , pl } or {p0 }. The depth
of the tree with nodes n1 , . . . , nk−1 is k − 1. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, our
algorithm ensures that a proof tree is constructed only when the confidentiality policies
of principals p1 , . . . , pk−1 are satisfied. Principal p0 ’s confidentiality policies are satisfied
vacuously, and pk ’s confidentiality policies of principal pk are also satisfied because our
algorithm on pk works in the same way as the case that pk constructs a proof tree of a single
depth responding to query qk−1 issued by principal p0 . Therefore, our algorithm ensures
that a proof tree is constructed only when the confidentiality policies of every principal is
satisfied. We cover all the cases in terms of confidentiality policies and conclude the proof.

4.6.2

Proof for integrity policies

We prove that our algorithm constructs a proof tree only if the integrity policies of every
participating principal are satisfied by induction below.

Base case: We first show that our claim holds in the case of a single-node proof tree.
Suppose that principal p0 makes query q0 to principal p1 , and p1 , which does not issue any
subqueries, returns a single-node proof tree. We only need to show that p0 ’s integrity poli54

cies are satisfied, because p0 does not disclose any information in its knowledge base. To
satisfy p0 ’s integrity policies, p0 must have an integrity policy (rp, t) such that rule pattern
rp matches query q and p1 belongs to set t. Line 31 in p0 ’s function
in Figure 4.6 obtains a proof from p1 by calling the function
line 32 in the function calls the function

GENERATE P ROOF

ISSUE R EMOTE Q UERY ,

CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY

and

whose line 3 ensures

that the proof satisfies the above condition. Therefore, principals p0 and p1 construct a
proof if their integrity policies are satisfied.

Induction step: We next show that if our claim holds for a proof tree whose depth is less
than k, then it also holds for a proof tree of depth k. We consider the case that a proof
tree is linear as we do in Section 4.6.1, because we can check the integrity of a proof tree
by checking whether every path from the root to each leaf node satisfies given integrity
policies. This claim is proved by induction as follows. The base case holds because there
is only a single node in a proof tree. Suppose that our claim holds for a proof tree of
depth k − 1. By induction hypothesis, each subtree of depth k − 1 satisfies the integrity
policies of every participating principal if every path from the root node to each leaf node
satisfies the integrity policies. If every path from the root node to each leaf node in the
proof tree of depth k satisfies integrity policies, the root node must satisfy the policies as
well. According to our definition of the integrity of a proof tree in Section 2.4.1, a proof
tree of depth k satisfies given integrity policies if the root node and all the subtrees of depth
k − 1 under the root node satisfy the integrity policies. Therefore, our claim holds for the
proof tree of depth k, and we conclude the proof of the above claim.
We assume the same linear proof tree in Section 4.6.1; that is, there is a linear tree of
length k where nodes n0 , . . . , nk are ordered from the root to the leaf. Let p0 , . . . , pk be
the principals that represent nodes n0 , . . . , nk respectively, and q0 , . . . , qk−1 be the queries
as before. When principal p0 issues query q0 to p1 , we consider the same two cases in
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Figure 4.8.
We first consider case 1. Because principal p1 does not belong to the set receivers(pk ),
principal p2 cannot distinguish query q1 issued by principal p1 from q1 issued by principal
p0 instead, because all the parameters in those queries are same in both cases. In the latter
case, by the induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures that a proof tree for query q1 is
constructed by principals p2 , . . . , pk if their integrity policies are satisfied. Because principals p2 , . . . , pk do not distinguish the former case from the latter, our algorithm ensures
their integrity policies in the former case as well. Principal p1 checks the integrity of the
proof from principal p2 in the same way regardless of whether p1 ’s issuing query q1 is for
handling query q0 or not. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, p1 ’s integrity policies are
satisfied. Principal p0 checks the integrity of the proof from principal p1 with the function
CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY

as follows. The integrity of the rule in node n1 is ensured in

line 6, and, by the induction hypothesis, the integrity of the subtree of depth k − 1 from
principal p2 is ensured in line 8 by checking the integrity of the proof tree whose root node
is n2 by calling the function

CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY

recursively. Therefore, the func-

tion ensures that p0 ’s integrity policies are satisfied with the proof tree from node n1 . We,
therefore, prove that our algorithm ensures the integrity policies of the principals p0 , . . . , pk
with a proof tree of depth k in case 1.
We next consider case 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that there is a principal
pl in receivers(pk ) between principal p0 and pk . There are two subcases to be considered.
In the first, subcase 2a, the subproof from principal pl is a single-node proof tree that
contains a query’s result; principals pl+1 , . . . , pk choose pl as the receiver of their nodes.
Because principals p0 , . . . , pl−1 are not aware of the fact that principal pl issues query ql ,
by the induction hypothesis, the integrity policies of principals p0 , . . . , pl−1 are satisfied.
The fact that principal p0 belongs to the list receivers(pl ) of query ql does not change the
behaviors of principals pl+1 , . . . , pk for handling query ql . Because our algorithm works
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for principals pl , . . . , pk in the same way that principal issues query ql independently, by
the induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures that principal pl ’s integrity policies are
satisfied for subcase 2a.
The second case 2b is that a proof from principal pl contains node nk whose proof tree
is encrypted with p0 ’s public key, as it could be done in line 19 of the function
ATE P ROOF

GENER -

in Figure 4.6. The proof from pl does not contain any other encrypted nodes

because pl needs to read the nodes nl+1 , . . . , nk−1 to check the integrity of the proof from
pl+1 . Principal pl checks whether the rules in nodes nl+1 , . . . , nk−1 satisfies pl ’s integrity
policies, which is done in line 6 of the function

CHECK P ROOF I NTEGRITY

in Figure 4.7.

If principal pl cannot decrypt all the nodes nl+1 , . . . , nk−1 , pl returns a proof that contains
FALSE because its failure to check the integrity of the proof, and, therefore, the proof tree
for query q0 is not constructed. Because principals p0 , . . . , pl−1 cannot distinguish whether
the encrypted boolean value in the proof from pl is generated by principal pl or its descendant principal pk , by the induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures that the integrity
polices of principals p0 , . . . , pl−1 are satisfied if p0 accepts a proof tree whose leaf node nl
contains an encrypted boolean value in node nk .
We next consider the integrity policies of principals pl , . . . , pk . In order for principal
pl to check the integrity of the proof from principal pl+1 , pl must read all the intermediate
nodes nl+1 , . . . , nk−1 in that proof. Therefore, principals pl+1 , . . . , pk−1 must choose pl
as the receiver principal of their returning proofs. Principal pl+1 , . . . , pk−1 work in the
same way as the case that principal pl issues query ql without receiving ql−1 so, by the
induction hypothesis, their integrity policies are preserved. Principal pk ’s integrity policies
are satisfied vacuously. Principal pl ’s algorithm for enforcing integrity policies does not
read the encrypted value in node nk and works in the same way regardless of returning a
proof to pk−1 or not. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, pl ’s integrity policies are also
preserved. We cover all the cases and conclude the proof.
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4.7

Example application

We revisit the example of an incident management system (IMS); in Figure 3.12, every
querier principal trusts the integrity of the principal that handles its query in terms of the
correctness of the query’s result. This time, we have some principals that define security
policies on rules as well as facts.
Figure 4.9 shows how user bob (principal p0 ) requests images from the surveillance
camera image server managed by the airport (principal p1 ). Principal p1 agrees with the
policy for role operation chief , that is, principal p2 ’s rule below satisfies p1 ’s integrity
policies.

role(P, operation chief ) ← roleIn(P, police chief , police dept) ∧ in(P, airport)

Therefore, principal p2 that runs the role-membership server of IMS uses that rule to evaluate a query role(bob, operation chief ). However, principal p1 does not trust the answer
from principal p2 , since p2 is temporarily assigned to manage the role server for the incident, and thus principal p1 does not establish a long-term trust relation with principal p2 .
Fortunately, principal p2 trusts the role-membership server of the police department and
the location tracking service run by principals p3 and p4 respectively, because those are
long-running existing services. Principal p2 is thus able to return a proof tree that contains the proofs from principal p3 and p4 , and principal p1 trusts that proof. The proof tree
also satisfies the confidentiality policies of principals p2 , p3 and p4 . Principal p4 only
returns the evaluation result of the query ?location(bob, airport) because it belongs to
trust(location(P, L)) = {p4 } defined by principal p1 .
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p0

?grant(bob)

grant(P ) ← role(P, operation chief )
trust(role(P, operation chief ) ← role(P, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(P, airport)) = {p 2 }
trust(role(P, R, police dept)) = {p3 }
trust(location(P, L)) = {p4 }

p1

p8

?role(bob, operation chief )
(p2 , p1 , ?role(bob, operation chief ),
(rule1 , ((p3 , p1 , ?roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept), T RU E), (p4 , p1 , ?location(bob, airport), T RU E))
rule1 ≡ role(P, operation chief )

p2

← roleIn(P, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(P, airport)
acl(role(P, R)) = {p1 }

?roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept)

?location(bob, airport)

(p3 , p1 , ?role(bob, police chief, police dept), T RU E)

(p4 , p1 , ?location(bob, airport), T RU E)

roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept)
acl(role(P, R, police dept)) = {p1 , p2 }

p3

location(P, L) ← owner(P, D) ∧ location(D, L)
acl(location(P, L)) = {p1 , p2 }
trust(location(D, L)) = {p6 }

p4

?owner(bob, pda15)

?location(pda15, L)

(p5 , p4 , ?owner(bob, pda15), T RU E)

(p6 , p4 , ?location(pda15, airport), T RU E)

owner(bob, pda15)
acl(owner(P, D)) = {p4 }

p5

p6

?wif i(pda15, X)

location(D, L) ← in(A, L) ∧ wif i(D, A)
in(ap39, airport)
acl(location(D, L)) = {p4 }
trust(wif i(D, L)) = {p7 }

(p7 , p6 , ?wif i(pda15, ap39), T RU E)

p7

wif i(pda15, ap39)
acl(wif i(D, airport)) = {p6 }

Figure 4.9: Example of an emergency response system. Principal p0 is a first responder whose role is “operation chief”. Principal p1 represents a surveillance camera image
server. Principal p2 is the role membership server of an incident management system (IMS).
Principal p3 is the role membership server of a police department. Principal p4 represents
a location-tracking service. The arrows represent the flow of queries among the principals.
Each arrow is labeled with a query and a returned proof tree. The query is shown above the
dashed line; the proof is shown below the line. Each principal’s rules, facts and policies are
shown in a dashed rectangle.
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Chapter 5
Caching and revocation mechanism
In this chapter, we describe a caching and revocation mechanism that improves the performance of our system. Our caching mechanism supports both positive and negative query
results and avoids issuing remote queries, which otherwise cause long latency due to cryptographic operations and the transmission of data over a network.
Our revocation mechanism ensures the freshness of cached information. To be sure
to produce a query result only with information that is generated recently, we need an
efficient mechanism that revokes obsolete cached information. Unlike existing revocation
methods [84, 87, 135] in which only an issuer of a certificate can revoke it, our scheme
must allow multiple hosts to revoke a given cached result because the result might depend
on (contextual) facts maintained by different hosts. Therefore, we develop a revocation
mechanism based on capabilities [110] in a distributed environment.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 introduces our approach for
capability-based revocation, and Section 5.2 describes the design of our caching and revocation mechanism. Section 5.3 describes the issue of race conditions among components in
our system and presents our synchronization mechanism to solve that issue. Section 5.4 discusses additional requirements for supporting negative caching. Finally, Section 5.5 shows
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a mechanism that keeps cached information fresh under the presence of an adversary who
is capable of intercepting revocation messages.

5.1

Capability-based revocation

Our caching mechanism allows each principal to cache a fact derived from a constructed
proof, and such a proof for a query could contain rules and facts published by multiple
different principals. Therefore, the derived fact from that proof must be revoked if any
information in the proof becomes invalid; that is, there might be multiple principals that
are eligible to revoke a cached fact. We, therefore, developed a revocation mechanism
based on capabilities [110] so that all the principals involved in constructing a proof may
revoke the derived result from the proof.
We extend the representation of a proof in Section 4.1 to associate a query result or a
rule in a proof with a capability, which is a large random number; that is, the nonterminals
rule and value pair in Figure 4.1 additionally include the nonterminal capability, and
their derivations are thus modified as follows.
< rule >

::=

‘(’ < head > ← < body >, < capability > ‘)’

< value pair >

::=

‘(’ < receiver >, < value >, < capability > ‘)’

< capability >

::=

< number >

The nonterminal rule includes the capability to associate a rule with a capability, and,
similarly, the nonterminal value pair includes the capability to associate it with a fact.
Thus, each node in a proof is associated with a capability generated by the principal who
publishes the information in that node. Since a principal who publishes a proof encrypts
the query result and capability together with a receiver principal’s public key, the capability
is a shared secret between the publisher and the receiver of the proof node. Therefore, the
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?owner(Bob, pda11)

PSfrag replacements

p2
pf2 ≡ (p0 , (T RU E, c2 )K0 )
?location(Bob, hospital)
p0

p1
(p0 , ((rule, c1 ), (pf2 )(pf3 ))K0 )
?location(pda11, hospital)
p3
pf3 ≡ (p0 , (T RU E, c3 )K0 )
c3

Figure 5.1: Capability-based revocation. The dashed line represents a revocation message
sent by principal p3 .
principal who sent the proof can later revoke the fact or rule in the proof by sending the
capability to the receiver principal. The sender principal of the revocation message does not
need to authenticate itself to the receiver principal who maintains the cached information.
Figure 5.1 describes our revocation scheme in a distributed environment. A principal
p0 issues a query ?location(Bob, hospital ), and a principal p1 returns a proof that consists
of a rule node produced by p1 and two leaf nodes produced by p2 and p3 respectively. A
principal p0 caches the fact location(Bob, hospital ) derived from the received proof. Since
principals p1 , p2 , and p3 contribute to constructing the proof tree, they all should be eligible
to revoke p0 ’s cached fact. Therefore, each principal pi for i = 1, 2, 3 includes a capability
ci into his produced node so that pi can revoke the proof later. A principal p0 who caches
the fact location(Bob, hospital ) associates it with the capabilities c1 , c2 , and c3 obtained
from the proof. Since principal p3 chose p0 , not p1 , as a receiver of his proof pf3 , p3 revokes
his proof by sending a capability c3 directly to principal p0 . Receiving that revocation message, a principal p0 removes the cached fact associated with the capability c3 . Principals p1
and p2 could revoke the same cached fact in the same way. Our capability-based revocation
does not involve any public-key operations, which are computationally expensive, because
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a revocation message can be directly sent to a principal that maintains a cached fact. When
our system constructs a proof tree responding to an authorization query, public-key encryptions are necessary to prevent intermediate principals between a sender and a receiver
principal from reading the sender’s query result. Furthermore, a revocation message does
not need to be signed by a sender principal, because the capability is known only to the
sender and the receiver of the revocation message. However, our revocation mechanism
does need symmetric-key encryption for transmitting some revocation messages, since a
revocation message contains an additional capability, which must be protected from eavesdroppers, when we revoke a negative query result, as we discuss in Section 5.4.

5.2

Design of a caching and revocation mechanism

Our revocation mechanism is based on a publisher-subscriber model; that is, a querier principal subscribes to a handler principal that handles his query, and the handler principal
sends a revocation message when the query result becomes invalid. This process might
occur recursively until all the cached facts that depend on the invalidated fact are revoked
across the network. Figure 5.2 shows the structure of our caching and revocation mechanism and the message flow among the components when a cached fact is revoked. Each
server consists of two components (an inference engine and a revocation handler) and four
data structures (a subscribers list, a dependencies list, a subscription list, and a knowledge
base). For brevity, we omit the query handler and query issuer that appear in Figure 3.2
from Figure 5.2. The inference engine is responsible for constructing a proof and caching
query results obtained from other principals with the knowledge base and the subscription
list. The engine also maintains information on other principals who issue a query to the engine with the subscribers and dependencies list so that the engine can revoke cached results
in remote hosts. When principal p1 receives a query q0 from principal p0 , p1 ’s inference
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1. q0

Inference
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2. q1

Inference engine

3. (f1 , (T RU E, c2 ))

8. (f0 , (T RU E, c1 ))
7. put(f0 , (p0 , c1 ))
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13. get(f0 )
(p0 , c1 )
Revocation
handler

p0

14. c1

6. put(f1 , f0 )

5. put(c2 , f1 )

Dependencies
list

Subscription
list

12. get(f1 )

10. get(c2 )

f0

Inference
engine

4. add(f1 )

Knowledge
base

11. remove(f1 )

f1

Revocation handler

p1

9. c2

Revocation
handler

p2

Figure 5.2: Structure of a caching and revocation mechanism. We omit the data structures
from the servers of p0 and p2 for brevity. The number at the beginning of each message
represents the sequence of the entire revocation process. The return value of a message is
shown under a dotted line in the messages 10, 12, and 13.
engine constructs a proof tree for a fact f0 , which is unified with q0 , and issues a subsequent
query q1 to principal p2 , and p2 returns a proof tree whose root node contains the unified
fact f1 and the pair of a query result T RU E and a capability c2 . Note that facts f0 and
f1 are identical to queries q0 and q1 respectively if those queries do not contain any variables. Principal p1 stores f1 as a fact into its knowledge base and also puts a key-value pair
(c2 , f1 ) into the subscription list (a hash table). Notice that we use the same knowledge base
to store cached results as well as local rules and facts. After constructing a proof tree for
f0 , the engine stores the pair (f1 , f0 ), which represents f0 ’s dependency on f1 , and a nested
tuple (f0 , (p0 , c1 )) into the dependencies and subscribers list respectively. The nested tuple
(f0 , (p0 , c1 )) expresses an if-then rule stating that a capability c1 must be sent to principal
p0 if fact f0 becomes invalid. The inference engine finishes handling query q0 by returning
a proof tree whose root node contains fact f0 and the pair of a query result T RU E and a
capability c1 .
The revocation process occurs when principal p2 sends a revocation message that contains a capability c2 . Principal p1 ’s revocation handler receives the message, obtains a fact
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to be revoked with capability c2 from the subscription list, and removes fact f1 from the
knowledge base. Next, the revocation handler obtains fact f0 , which depends on f1 , from
the dependencies list and then accesses the subscribers list to obtain a capability c1 for
revoking principal p0 ’s cached fact f0 , and sends c1 to p0 ’s revocation handler. The same
process is repeated on p0 ’s server.
If a capability is a shared secret that is only used once, a capability does not need to be
encrypted as we explain in this section. In Section 5.4 below, though, we add support for
caching negative results and in that case we do need an encrypted channel for this message.

5.3

Synchronization mechanism

There is a race condition to be resolved between the inference engine and the revocation
handler, because both modules access the four data structures in Figure 5.2. For example,
it is possible that the revocation handler accesses the subscription list with a capability c
that revokes a fact f before the inference engine writes the subscription information (i.e.,
(c, f )) to that list.
However, we cannot use a coarse mutual exclusion mechanism that allows the thread
of the inference engine to block other threads’ access to the data structure while processing
a query, since a deadlock occurs when the engine issues a remote query that causes a
closed cycle of subsequent queries by remote servers. For example, if a downstream server
that receives a subsequent query issues a remote query back to the server of the inference
engine, a new thread that is created to handle that query blocks because the inference engine
on that server already obtains a lock on the data structures, which the new thread needs to
access. Thus, the inference engine would wait for a reply for the remote query forever.
We, therefore, built a fine-grained synchronization mechanism that ensures that the
engine that receives a proof-tree node with capability c updates the data structures before
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the revocation handler that receives a capability c accesses them. To achieve this, our
system creates a monitor object per capability and maintains a pair of a capability and a
monitor object in a hash table. Figure 5.3 shows the pseudo code for the synchronization
algorithm for the inference engine and the revocation handler. We use a monitor object
in Figure 5.3a to block the revocation handler until the inference engine finishes handling
a query. All the methods of this monitor object are an atomic operation, and thus more
than two threads execute a thread concurrently. Since only the inference engine needs to
block the other thread (i.e., the revocation handler), the lock of the monitor is set when it is
created and is released when the inference engine calls the release method after it finishes
handling the query. The notifyAll function in the release method sends a signal to awaken
all the threads that are waiting on the monitor object. The revocation handler thread that
calls the wait method is blocked until the lock is released.
Since a monitor object must be created dynamically either by the inference engine or the
revocation handler, we need to synchronize access to a global hash table that maintains a set
of monitor objects with a capability as a key. Figure 5.3b shows the handleQuery method
of the inference engine. The method first checks whether there exists a monitor object for a
given capability. If the object does not exist, it creates a new monitor object and puts it into
the hash table. The access to the hash table in the synchronized block is mutually exclusive
among all the threads; the code inside the synchronized block is an atomic operation on the
hash table. The method then continues to process a query and releases the lock of the
object after handling the query. Figure 5.3c shows the handleRevocation method of the
revocation handler. It also creates a monitor object for a given capability, if necessary.
Then, it calls the wait method to wait for the inference engine to finish handling the query.
If the inference engine has already finished it, the wait method does not block the thread
of the revocation handler.
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class Monitor {
boolean flag;
synchronized Monitor() {
flag = true;
}
synchronized release() {
flag = false;
notifyAll();
}

}

synchronized wait() {
if(flag)
wait();
}

(a) Monitor object

Hashtable monitors;

Hashtable monitors;

handleQuery(long c) {
synchronized (monitors) {
Monitor monitor = monitors.get(c);
if(monitor == NULL) {
monitor = new Monitor();
monitors.put(c, monitor);
}
}

handleRevocation(long c) {
synchronize(monitors) {
Monitor monitor = monitors.get(c);
if(monitor == NULL) {
monitor = new Monitor();
monitors.put(c, monitor);
}
}
monitor.wait();

// Handle a query...
}

// Handle a revocation...

monitor.release();

}

(b) the handleQuery method of
the inference engine

(c) the handleRevocation method of
the revocation handler

Figure 5.3: Synchronization algorithm for the inference engine and the revocation handler. We omit parameters that are not relevant to our synchronization mechanism from
Figure 5.3a and b.

5.4

Negative caching

Our system also supports caching negative facts (i.e., facts that are false), because a principal cannot return a negative result when he does not find any matched fact for the query
in the local knowledge base; another principal might have a fact that matches with the
query. To make a negative decision locally, a principal must cache a negative result after
the attempt to obtain the queried fact from remote principals fails.
To support negative caching, each principal maintains the same set of data structures
in Figure 5.2; that is, each server maintains another knowledge base that stores negative
facts. The semantics of a negative revocation are different from that of positive caching;
that is, when a cached negative fact is revoked, that fact can be cached as a positive fact.
(On the other hand, to revoke a positive fact does not necessary mean that the revoked fact
is no longer true; there might be another proof that derives the fact. Note that if a host that
maintains a positive fact has first-hand knowledge about the validity of that fact without
checking with other hosts, that host could convert the revoked positive fact into a negative
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cached fact.)
When a negative fact is revoked, we must find an entry (c, f ) in the negative subscription list, where c is a capability and f is the revoked fact, and move it to the subscription
list for positive cached facts. However, we cannot use the same capability c for the entry
in the positive list, because it might cause inconsistency about the subscription information
between the sender and receiver of a revocation message in the case where the revocation
message is lost. For example, suppose that we use the same capability for a switched positive cached fact. When a principal who sends another principal a revocation message for
a negative cached fact, the sender principal moves the corresponding subscription information from the subscribers list of negative facts to that of positive facts. However, if the
receiver principal does not receive the message because of a network failure, the receiver
principal continues to maintain the negative cached fact, which is supposed to be revoked.
When the sender principal later sends a revocation message that revokes the switched positive cached fact, the receiver principal revokes the negative cached fact instead. Thus, the
inconsistency about the cached information occurs.
Therefore, a revocation message for a negative cached result needs to contain a new
capability to revoke the switched positive cached result. Since the new capability must
be a shared secret between a sender and a receiver of the revocation message, we need to
encrypt the message with a shared key between those two parties. However, to establish a
symmetric secure channel for all the pairs of two principals that participate in our system
requires n2 symmetric keys, where n is the number of participating principals. To avoid
this key-management challenge, our system encrypts a revocation message with the same
randomly generated symmetric key that is used to encrypt the proof node that contains the
cached result as we describe in Section 4.4; that is, each server records the capabilities in
a received proof with a symmetric key that is used to decrypt that proof. Suppose that the
proof contains a node with a capability cn and was encrypted with a symmetric key K when
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the server receives it. A server stores a (cn , K) pair in a hash table to handle a revocation
message (cn , (cn , cp )K ) where cn is a capability that revokes a current negative result, cp is
a capability that revokes the switched positive result in the future, and K is the symmetric
key associated with cn . When a server receives this message, it first obtains a symmetric
key K corresponding to the capability cn in the message from the hash table, and decrypts
(cn , cp )K with that key. If the first element of the decrypted tuple is same as the capability in
the first field of the revocation message, the server considers that revocation message valid
and revokes the corresponding fact. We continue to use the key K if we later revoke the
fact that corresponds to the capability cp . In a way, the symmetric key K is a real capability
and the capability cn as an indirect reference to K.
The dependencies list for negative facts maintains dependencies between a fact in a
query and facts that were tried but, being false, were not used to construct a proof for
the query; that is, it might be possible to construct a proof for the query if one of those
facts exists in the positive knowledge base. When a server receives notice of revocation
for a negative cached fact, it tries again to build proofs that were not constructed because
of that negative cached fact. We only use facts in the local knowledge base to construct
those proofs, because issuing remote queries could make latency for revocation significantly longer. On the other hand, the latency for processing a query only with a local
knowledge base is negligible compared with that for transmitting data over a network or
performing cryptographic operations as we see in Chapter 6.

5.5

Timeliness of cached information

Our system must ensure that all the cached facts meet a given timeliness condition; all the
timestamps associated with cached facts must be within a given interval between the current time and a recent past time. To simply keep the latest messages does not guarantee the
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freshness of the cached facts because some hosts might crash or an adversary might intercept revocation messages so a server would make an incorrect decision based on obsolete
cached information.
We, therefore, develop a mechanism that ensures the freshness of cached positive and
negative facts obtained from remote servers. The updater thread on each server periodically
sends each subscriber in a subscribers list a message that updates the timestamp of a cached
fact by sending the capability with a new timestamp. We assume that all the server clocks
are approximately synchronized. Since the server sends the same capability to refresh the
same cached fact repeatedly, the updater thread encrypts the message with the same symmetric key that would be used to send a revocation message for revoking that cached fact.
The watcher thread on another server receives that message and updates the timestamp of
the fact in a subscription list. The watcher thread must synchronize with the inference engine using the same synchronization method we describe in Section 5.3. If the watcher
thread finds any subscription with an old timestamp (possibly because an adversary intercepts revocation messages), it discards that subscription and initiates the revocation process
described in Section 5.2.
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Chapter 6
Experimental results
In this chapter, we present the experimental results for our system. Many context-aware
applications, such as an emergency-response system in which responders continuously access information on an incident over a period from a few hours to several days, need to keep
track of a user’s privileges continuously. Therefore, our focus is to show that our caching
mechanism significantly improves amortized performance of our system, while ensuring
the freshness of cached information.
We used a 27-node cluster connected with a Gigabit Ethernet. Each node had two
2.8GHz Intel XEONs and 4GB RAM, and ran RedHat Linux 9 and Sun Microsystem’s
Java runtime (v1.5.0-hotspot). Our system had approximately 12,000 lines of Java code,
extending the Prolog engine XProlog [114]. We used the Java Cryptographic Extension
(JCE) framework, which provides RSA [99] and Triple-DES (TDES) [33] cryptographic
operations.
The algorithm of the RSA operations in JCE conforms to the encryption scheme RSAESPKCS1-v1 5 in Public-key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) #1 [93]. We used a 1024-bit
public key whose public exponent is fixed to 65537 in our experiments. PKCS #1 uses
the EME-PKCS1-v1 5 padding method [93] to encrypt or sign a message. The RSA sign71

ing operation uses MD5 [98] to compute the hash value of a message. We used Outer-CBC
TDES in EDE mode [33] to perform symmetric key operations. The length of our DES keys
was 192 bits, and the padding operation in TDES operations conforms to RFC 1423 [96].
Note that our system is not particularly optimized for performance and that all the code
(including the cryptography library) is written in Java. Nevertheless, our experimental results show that our system with the caching mechanism is usable without being turned for
performance. It is possible to improve the performance of our system by using a more
efficient cryptography library such the OpenSSL toolkit [90].
We assume that each principal obtains the public keys of the principals when it defines its integrity policies and establish a session key with each of those principals before
handling queries; that is, the performance cost of PKI is not included in our experiments.
In Section 6.1, we present a detailed study about the performance of our system without
our caching mechanism. In Section 6.2, we compare the latency for handling a query with
and without our caching mechanism. Finally, in Section 6.3, we show the results of the
experiments that measured the latency for revoking a cached fact.

6.1

Analysis of performance overhead

We first analyze the performance overhead of our system without the caching mechanism.
Our first experiment measured the latency of the system with two hosts that did not use
the caching mechanism. One host maintains a rule a0(P ) ← a00(P ), and the other host
maintains a fact a00(bob). When the former host receives a query ?a0(bob), it issues a
remote query ?a00(bob) to the other host.
We measured the wall-clock latency for handling a query and also the latency of each
cryptographic operation in that process. The measurement is iterated one hundred times,
and we report the average and standard deviation of the measurements. Table 6.1 shows
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the results. Note that some of the operations in Table 6.1 involve multiple cryptographic
operations: The “TDES encryption on a returning proof” in Table 6.1 involves three TDES
operations for encrypting a proof node, a proof tree, and a proof itself recursively. Similarly, the “TDES decryption on a received proof” involves three TDES operations. the
“RSA encryption on DES keys” involves two encryption operations: one is an encryption of a DES key for a proof node and the other is that for a proof tree. Similarly, RSA
decryption on DES keys involves two decryption operations. Also, note that our current
implementation encodes a proof as a set of Java objects that correspond to the string representation of the proof in Section 4.1. The size of the Java objects was much larger than that
of the corresponding string. For example, the size of strings for a query and a proof in this
experiment was less than 124 bytes.
As we see in Table 6.1, public key operations consumed most of the processing time. On
host 0, the “RSA decryption on a DES key” from host 1 used 53% of the local processing
time. The “TDES decryption on a proof” also used another 22% of the time. On host 1,
the “RSA encryption on DES keys” used 22% of the local processing time, and signing a
proof with a RSA private key used another 17%. These results indicate that our caching
scheme should improve the performance because a successful cache hit avoids all of these
public key operations.
Table 6.2 compares the basic cost of each cryptographic operation per operation and
per byte. When we compare per-byte operations, TDES operations were a few orders of
magnitude faster than RSA operations. The TDES operations on a proof was an order of
magnitude faster than that on a query. One possible reason is that the cost for computing
a key schedule in a TDES operation becomes relatively larger portion of the total cost, as
the data to be encrypted or decrypted gets smaller. It is not clear why the TDES encryption
of a query is slightly faster than the TDES decryption of the query. The RSA encryption
with a public key was not significantly faster than RSA encryption with a private key due
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Total latency
Issue remote queries
Local computation
Read objects from a remote host
TDES decryption on a received query
TDES encryption on a returning proof
TDES decryption on a received proof
TDES encryption on an issued query
RSA decryption on DES keys
RSA encryption on DES keys
Create a RSA signature for a proof
Verify a RSA signatures for a proof

latency
138.1
87.9
50.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
10.9
1.2
26.6
0.0
0.0
2.2

host 0
std. dev.
10.5
5.5
6.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.1
0.9
1.2
0.0
0.0
0.9

ratio

1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.22
0.02
0.53
0.00
0.00
0.04

host 1
latency std.dev
85.2
5.1
0.0
0.0
85.2
5.1
41.2
0.7
2.2
0.4
10.9
3.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
18.7
2.0
14.4
1.5
0.0
0.0

ratio

1.00
0.48
0.03
0.12
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.22
0.17
0.00

Table 6.1: Average latency for processing a query with two hosts without caching capability. The latency is measured in milliseconds. The std. dev columns show the standard
deviation of each measurement. The ratio columns show the ratio of the latency of each
primitive operation compared with the total local processing time.
to the inefficient implementation of Java cryptography library (JCE). To initialize a Java
Cipher object that provides a method for performing a public-key operation took much of
the time, and the operation of modulo exponentiation in a public-key operation was indeed
an order of magnitude faster than that in a private-key operation. In RSA encryption on
a DES key, to initialize a Cipher object takes 8.3 milliseconds and modulo exponentiation
takes 1.0 milliseconds. On the other hand, in RSA decryption on a DES key, the latency for
initializing a Cipher object is negligible and modular exponentiation takes 9.3 milliseconds.
An operation for signing a proof is slightly slower than an operation for RSA decryption
because the former involves the computation of the MD5 hash value of a proof.
We next study the performance impact of changing the integrity policies that are sent to
a handler principal along with a query. We compared the latency for handling the query in
the example of the emergency response system in Figure 3.12 and Figure 4.9. In both cases,
a set of principals pi (for i = 1, . . . , 7) handled the same query. However, the query that
principal p1 issued to p2 was attached with different integrity policies in those two cases.
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TDES encryption on a query
TDES decryption on a query
TDES encryption on a proof
TDES decryption on a proof
RSA encryption on a DES key
RSA decryption on a DES key
Create a RSA signature for a proof
Verify a RSA signatures for a proof

byte length
723
723
34184
34184
128
128
128
128

latency
1.2
2.2
11.3
11.3
9.3
13.3
14.4
2.2

latency per byte
0.0017
0.003
0.00033
0.00033
0.07
0.1
0.11
0.017

Table 6.2: Basic costs of cryptographic operations. The latency is measured in milliseconds. The first column shows the byte length of data on which an operation is performed.
A single TDES encryption and decryption on a proof involves the encryption of a proof
node, a proof tree, and a proof. The byte lengths of those objects were 6507 bytes, 13579
bytes, and 14098 bytes respectively, and their total length was 34184 bytes.
In Figure 3.12, all the principals that issue a query trust a handler principal in terms of the
integrity of a query result. For example, responding to a query from principal p1 , principal
p2 returns a proof that contains only a root node. In Figure 4.9, however, principal p1 only
trusts the integrity of p2 ’s rule that is used to handle p1 ’s query. Thus, principal p2 returns
a proof that consists of a root node that contains p2 ’s rule and two leaf fact nodes produced
by principals p3 and p4 respectively. The other principals’ integrity policies are same as in
Figure 3.12.
We measured wall-clock latency for handling a query one hundred times and report the
average of the measurements. We also measured the latency of each primitive operation
on each server as we did in the previous experiment. Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 show the
results for the cases in Figure 3.12 and Figure 4.9, respectively. The standard deviation of
the total latency in the cases of Figure 3.12 and Figure 4.9 was 57.4 and 65.4 milliseconds
respectively.
In this experiment, each principal pi ran on a separate host i. We also show in Figure 6.1
the comparison of the local processing time of each host in these two cases. The total
latency of host 0 in Table 6.4 was 105 milliseconds longer than that in Table 6.3, largely due
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to two cryptographic operations performed on host 1. One was the RSA decryption on DES
keys. Table 6.4 shows that the latency for that operation on host 1 was 78.9 milliseconds,
while the corresponding latency in Table 6.3 is only 26.6 milliseconds. We see that the
latency for RSA decryption on TDES keys was approximately proportional to the number
of DES keys contained in a proof; that is, host 1 in Figure 4.9 decrypted three TDES keys
in a proof, while host 1 in Figure 3.12 decrypted only one DES key.
The other operation that contributed to the increase of the latency was the decryption
of a received proof with a DES key. The latency for that operation in Table 6.4 is 50.5
milliseconds, while the corresponding latency in Table 6.3 was 10.1 milliseconds. The
latency increased because the proof in the former case was larger than that in the latter case;
that is the proof in the former case contained three nodes, while the latter only contained a
single root node.
In contrast, the local processing time at host 2 in Table 6.4 was shorter than that in
Table 6.3, because principal p2 in Figure 4.9 forwarded the proofs from principals p3 and
p4 to principal p1 by including them into the proof returned to p1 without decrypting those
proofs. Therefore, there was no operation for RSA decryption on DES keys on host 2 in
Figure 4.9, as we see in Table 6.4. Principal p2 did not have to check the digital signatures of
the proofs from p3 and p4 . However, when comparing Table 6.4 to Table 6.3, we see that the
increase of the latency in host 1 was larger than the decrease of the latency in host 2 as we
see in Figure 6.1. A large proof that is transmitted across hosts has an effect of increasing
processing time of a particular host that receives that proof, because the receiving host
needs to check the integrity of the large proof by traversing each node. Therefore, the
imbalance of workload among hosts is likely to increase total latency for processing a
query. The results for hosts 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are almost identical in both cases, since their
operations are same in both cases except for the receiver principals of principal p4 ’s result.
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Total latency
Issue remote queries
Local computation
Read objects from remote hosts
TDES decryption on received queries
TDES encryption on returning proofs
TDES decryption on received proofs
TDES encryption on issued queries
RSA decryption on DES keys
RSA encryption on DES keys
Create RSA signatures for proofs
Verify RSA signatures for proofs

Total latency
Issue remote queries
Local computation
Read objects from remote hosts
TDES decryption on received queries
TDES encryption for returning proofs
TDES decryption for received proofs
TDES encryption on issued queries
RSA decryption on DES keys
RSA encryption on DES keys
Create RSA signatures for proofs
Verify RSA signatures for proofs

host 0
latency ratio
950.0
901.3
48.7 1.00
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
9.6 0.20
1.2 0.02
26.7 0.55
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
2.2 0.05
host 4
latency ratio
492.2
313.8
178.4 1.00
41.1 0.23
1.4 0.01
3.3 0.02
20.6 0.12
1.9 0.01
53.4 0.30
18.1 0.10
14.1 0.08
4.3 0.02

host 1
latency ratio
898.2
766.4
131.9 1.00
41.2 0.31
1.2 0.01
3.5 0.03
10.1 0.08
0.8 0.01
26.6 0.20
18.2 0.14
14.2 0.11
2.2 0.02
host 5
latency ratio
85.8
0.0
85.8 1.00
41.4 0.48
2.2 0.03
3.3 0.04
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
19.2 0.22
14.7 0.17
0.0 0.00

host 2
latency ratio
762.7
584.0
178.7 1.00
41.3 0.23
1.7 0.01
3.2 0.02
19.5 0.11
2.1 0.01
53.0 0.30
18.0 0.10
14.1 0.08
4.2 0.02
host 6
latency ratio
221.6
88.6
133.0 1.00
41.5 0.31
1.6 0.01
3.7 0.03
10.2 0.08
0.8 0.01
26.3 0.20
18.4 0.14
14.3 0.11
2.1 0.02

host 3
latency ratio
85.9
0.0
85.9 1.00
41.3 0.48
2.5 0.03
3.4 0.04
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
18.9 0.22
14.7 0.17
0.0 0.00
host 7
latency ratio
85.3
0.0
85.3 1.00
41.4 0.49
2.1 0.02
3.1 0.04
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
18.9 0.22
14.7 0.17
0.0 0.00

Table 6.3: Average latency for processing a query in Figure 3.12. Every principal who
issues a query trusts a principal that handles that query in terms of the integrity of a fact in
that query.
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Total latency
Issue remote queries
Local computation
Read objects from remote hosts
TDES decryption on received queries
TDES encryption on returning proofs
TDES decryption on received proofs
TDES encryption on issued queries
RSA decryption on DES keys
RSA encryption on DES keys
Create RSA signatures for proofs
Verify RSA signatures for proofs

Total latency
Issue remote queries
Local computation
Read objects from remote hosts
TDES decryption on received queries
TDES encryption for returning proofs
TDES decryption for received proofs
TDES encryption on issued queries
RSA decryption on DES keys
RSA encryption on DES keys
Create RSA signatures for proofs
Verify RSA signatures for proofs

host 0
latency ratio
1055.0
1006.1
48.9 1.00
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
9.7 0.20
1.3 0.03
26.6 0.54
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
2.2 0.04
host 4
latency ratio
492.2
313.2
178.8 1.00
41.1 0.23
1.6 0.01
3.3 0.02
20.1 0.11
1.8 0.01
52.3 0.29
18.6 0.10
14.6 0.08
4.1 0.02

host 1
latency ratio
1003.5
752.2
251.3 1.00
40.9 0.16
1.6 0.01
3.4 0.01
50.5 0.20
0.9 0.00
78.9 0.31
18.0 0.07
14.2 0.06
7.0 0.03
host 5
latency ratio
85.7
0.0
85.7 1.00
41.3 0.48
2.5 0.03
3.1 0.04
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
18.8 0.22
14.4 0.17
0.0 0.00

host 2
latency ratio
725.2
584.3
141.0 1.00
41.1 0.29
2.9 0.02
17.6 0.12
8.5 0.06
1.9 0.01
0.0 0.00
26.0 0.18
15.9 0.11
0.0 0.00
host 6
latency ratio
221.1
88.8
132.3 1.00
41.3 0.31
1.7 0.01
3.6 0.03
9.8 0.07
0.8 0.01
26.3 0.20
18.7 0.14
14.3 0.11
2.2 0.02

host 3
latency ratio
85.6
0.0
85.6 1.00
41.1 0.48
2.4 0.03
3.3 0.04
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
18.9 0.22
14.5 0.17
0.0 0.00
host 7
latency ratio
85.5
0.0
85.5 1.00
41.5 0.49
2.2 0.03
3.0 0.04
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
0.0 0.00
18.9 0.22
14.7 0.17
0.0 0.00

Table 6.4: Average latency for processing a query in Figure 4.9. Principal p1 who issues a
query to p2 trusts only the integrity of p2 ’s rule, which is used to handle p1 ’s query.
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Figure 6.1: Comparison of local processing time at each principal in Figure 3.12 (basic
case) and Figure 4.9 (general case).
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6.2

Latency for handling queries

We next measured the latency for handling a query with different-size proof trees to evaluate the scalability of our caching scheme. We performed our experiments with 27 servers
run by different principals; those servers could correspond to 27 different agencies in the
emergency-response system. Our test program generated authorization, confidentiality, and
integrity policies for those principals so that our system constructs a proof tree of a given
size (i.e., the number of nodes in the proof tree) for a given query. Each query takes the
form of ?grant(P, R) where P is a principal and R is a resource. The body of each rule
takes the form of a0 (c0 ), . . . , an−1 (cn−1 ) where ai for i = 0 to n − 1 is a predicate symbol
and ci for i = 0 to n − 1 is a constant. The size of the domain of predicate symbols is
1,000, and the size of the domain of constants is 20. There are possibly 20,000 different
atoms in authorization policies that our test program generates, and it is, therefore, unlikely
that a cache hit occurs when a query is evaluated for the first time. The generated policies ensures that every querier principal satisfied the confidentiality policies of a handler
principal to which it issued a query, and the handler principal satisfied the querier principal’s integrity policies. Those policies are independent of any particular application; that
is, our test program chose the topology of a proof tree randomly. However, we conducted
our experiment up to a proof tree with 50 nodes, which we believe is significantly larger
than that in most applications, and, therefore, our results should provide guidelines about
the worst-case latency of those applications. We prepared the facts and rules to allow ten
different proof trees of each size, and in the experiment a given host issued a sequence of
ten different queries of that size.
Our latency measurements also include the performance overhead for handling revocation messages. While measuring latency for handling queries 100 times, our test driver
program updated all the facts in the knowledge bases dynamically. We assumed the extreme
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case that all the facts in each proof tree are dynamic contextual facts, and updated every fact
20 times per second during the experiments. We believe that this update frequency is much
faster than most context-aware applications need. The test driver updated the knowledge
bases so that half of the queries in our experiments succeeded in constructing a proof tree,
because the average latency could vary significantly, depending on how many of the queries
succeeded in constructing a proof. (The latency for building a proof tree is longer than that
for failing to build the tree, because the inference engine stops constructing a proof tree
when it fails to resolve its current goal.)
Figure 6.2(a) compares query-handling latency under five different conditions; each
data point is an average of 100 runs. In the No caching, with RSA case, each server did not
cache any results obtained from other servers and used public-key operations for encrypting
DES keys and signing proof trees. No caching, with TDES is same as the first case, except
that every pair of the principals shared a secret DES key and used it to attach a message
authentication code (MAC) using Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication (HMACMD5) hashing algorithm [12, 65] to authenticate an encrypted proof1 . We included this
case to show that to use symmetric key operations instead of public-key operations (assuming that all the pair of the principals share a secret key) does not solve the problem of the
long latency for handling a query. In the Warm caching case, every server cached results
from other servers and we used only the latency data after the first round of ten different
queries to compute average latency. In the Cold caching case, every server cached results
from other servers and all the latency data including that of the initial round of queries were
used to compute average latency. In the Local processing case, all the rules and facts were
stored in a single server. Therefore, there was no remote query involved, and no encryption.
The two cases without caching show significantly longer latency than the other three
1

A collision attack on MD5 is not possible because a malicious third party does not know a secret key
shared by a sender principal and a receiver principal.
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cases, although using MD5 and TDES operations rather than RSA reduced the latency 15 –
50%. The latency grew longer than 500 ms when a proof tree contained more than ten
nodes. Figure 6.2(b) shows the same latency results for the other three cases, omitting the
case of no caching. The latency of the cold caching case was 5 to 20 times longer than that
of the warm caching, because the initial queries require the whole process of constructing
a proof tree as in the case of no caching. The latency of the warm caching case was 2 to
15 times higher than that of the local processing case. The reason for the longer latency
is a cache miss due to a revocation of a positive cached fact. However, the latency of the
warm caching case was 3 to 23 times faster than the cold caching case, and thus we could
improve the performance by prefetching query results in advance.
Although we conducted the experiments in a cluster with low-latency connections, our
implementation to some extent simulates a low-latency network by encoding a proof as
a set of Java objects, which is much larger than the corresponding string representation.
Also, our caching mechanism could improve the performance of the system even more
drastically in a wireless environment with low bandwidth and high data-loss ratio, because
to handle a query with local cache is a common case for a long-running continuous query.
The mechanism in Section 5.5 refreshes cached information periodically, and thus prevents
making false positive decisions due to a disconnected wireless network.

6.3

Latency for revoking cached facts

We measured the latency for revoking cached facts with another experiment. We used
linear proof trees of various depths to measure the latency between the moment the test
driver sent an event that updated a fact in the knowledge base and the moment that the test
driver received the notification of a revoked cached fact from the root server that handles
queries from the test driver. We conducted the same experiment 100 times and report the
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average of the measurements. Figure 6.3 shows the latency for revoking cached facts with
four different frequencies for updating the knowledge bases. The results show that the
latency increased linearly as the depth of a proof tree grows. The latency slightly increased
as the period for publishing an event decreased. The system handled 100 events per second
with the latency less than 600 ms and a proof tree of depth 10.
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(b) Three cases without no-caching cases.

Figure 6.2: Latency for handling queries.
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Figure 6.3: Average latency for revoking cached facts. Each curve represents a different
period between fact updates in the knowledge bases, in milliseconds.
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Chapter 7
Related work
In this chapter, we first cover existing context-sensitive authorization systems that consider context information to make an authorization decision. Those systems provide a rulebased authorization language that allows a policy maker to refer to context information in
a central server. In Section 7.2, we cover distributed authorization systems that fetch information from remote servers while making an authorization decision. In Section 7.3, we
cover trust-management systems that support an authorization language that makes it possible to express trust relations among principals. In Section 7.4, we cover trust negotiation
systems, which are considered to be special cases of the distributed authorization systems
where a client and a server exchange credentials to establish trust. The trust negotiation
systems are similar to our systems in that they provide explicit mechanisms for protecting
confidentiality policies. We clarify that those systems have different objectives and thus
provide different mechanisms. In Section 7.5, we cover several variants of two-party secure function evaluation (SFE) that protects a client’s private credentials from a server in a
trust management system. Finally, in Section 7.6, we cover systems that support caching
mechanisms for an inference engine.
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7.1

Context-sensitive authorization systems

Although others have developed context-sensitive authorization systems, they all use a
trusted central server that maintains authorization policies and context information. In those
authorization systems, it is implicitly assumed that all the context information providers
trust the central server to protect their information properly. The major difference among
the existing context-sensitive authorization systems is an authorization language they support. Cerberus [5] uses a first-order logic to express policies and context information. Generalized RBAC (GRBAC) [30, 31, 32], OASIS [8, 52], and Tripathi’s resource discovery
system [112] adopt role-based access control (RBAC) [103], and use a propositional logic
to define context sensitive roles. Myles’ [88] language is written in XML. Mostéfaoui [86]
and Apu [62] represent context information as a decision tree. Masone [82] developed a
role definition language (RDL) based on SQL. We cover each existing context-sensitive
authorization system below.
Cerberus [5] allows principals to define context-sensitive policies based on first-order
logic. It expresses context information with context predicates such as “Location” and
“Temperature”, similar to our approach. Cerberus has a monolithic context infrastructure
that contains current and historical context information, and a single inference engine evaluates all the authorization decisions.
Myles [88] provides an XML-based authorization language for defining privacy policies that protect users’ location information, and those privacy policies could be contextsensitive. A user registers a validator that maintains the user’s privacy policy into a location
server. When the location server receives a request for accessing the user’s location, the
server asks the user’s validator to make an authorization decision. That validator could
access other validators to obtain information to handle the query from the location server.
They assume that all validators trust with each other in terms of the confidentiality and

87

integrity of information.
Users must trust a set of validators that collect context information and make authorization decisions. Hulsebosch [57] developed an access-control system that supports contextsensitive policies. The major objective of their system is to allow users to access a service
anonymously; a user provides his context information instead of his identity to be granted
access to a service. However, their scheme requires a central context broker server that
anonymizes the users’ context information, and users must trust that broker server not to
disclose their identifiable context information. There is no detail about their authorization
language in their paper. They suggest adopting several verification methods that ensure the
accuracy of context information, but no detail is covered in the paper.
Generalized RBAC (GRBAC) [30, 31, 32] introduces the environmental role (ERole)
to achieve context-aware authorization. Their approach is based on the concept of Rolebased access-control (RBAC). Constraints on environmental (context) variables can be defined with a Prolog-like logic language. Authorization is based on an ordinary role and an
ERole; in effect, the ERole is an additional condition to be satisfied for an authorization
decision. GRBAC has a central context management service that maintains a snapshot of
current environmental conditions and has a central authorization engine that interacts with
that service. They conducted experiments to measure latency for handling an authorization
query with a policy that contains varying number of environmental roles and studied the
effect of caching the environmental roles’ evaluations. However, each of their measurements only involves a single rule, which is a conjunction of RRoles, maintained in a central
authorization server.
Tripathi [112] presents a secure resource discovery system for pervasive computing.
The major objective of their system is to allow a mobile user to access resources in different domains seamlessly by binding the resource names with the resources dynamically
according to the user’s context. Each resource in an environment is protected based on
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context-sensitive role-based access control scheme. This approach is similar to Covington’s ERole [30, 32]; contextual conditions are defined as preconditions to be satisfied before performing a requested operation. There is no detail about the architecture and design
of the system in their paper.
OASIS [8, 52] is an RBAC system that can evaluate contextual conditions at both roleactivation time and access time. The context conditions are expressed as context predicates
in the Horn clauses of role-activation rules. OASIS has a central object-relational database
that stores context predicates and also has a central authorization engine.
Mostéfaoui [85] proposes a role-based authorization system that considers context information. A centralized context engine collects context information from other context
servers. The engine authenticates context servers to obtain only trusted information. However, there is no detail about the design of the system and security policies. Mostéfaoui [86]
later proposes to express context-sensitive authorization policies with a contextual graph instead of a logical language. The context graph, which is similar to a decision tree, consists
of nodes that represent contextual conditions and edges that specify the order to evaluate
those conditions. Each path from a starting node to a goal node specifies the conditions
that must be satisfied to get a privilege. Their focus is to make policies understandable, and
there is no detail about the design and implementation of a system that supports policies
represented as a contextual graph.
Masone [82] developed a role definition language (RDL) for defining context-sensitive
roles. Unlike other context-sensitive role-based authorization systems that use logical expressions to specify conditions for a role membership, RDL applies mathematical set notation to define a set of role members. A role definition in RDL is converted into event
handlers that stores context events into a relational database and role membership publishers that publish a list of role members every time the list of members has changed.
KNOW [62] is a user-feedback mechanism for a context-sensitive authorization system.
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KNOW uses Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs) to express context-sensitive
policies. An OBDD has two kinds of nodes: terminal and non-terminal. Non-terminal
nodes represent atomic propositions, which are conditions in authorization policies, and
terminal nodes contain a boolean value TRUE or FALSE. Each path from a root node to a
terminal node that contains a TRUE value specifies a set of propositions to be satisfied to
be granted access. When a user’s request is denied, KNOW traverses the OBDD and finds
a set of propositions that must be turned true. If there are multiple such alternative sets, it
uses cost functions to compare the usefulness to the user. KNOW protects authorization
policies with meta-policies, which corresponds to our confidentiality policies, and avoids
disclosing confidential policies to the user who receives feedback. Since KNOW maintains
all the policies in a central server, KNOW’s approach is not applicable to a distributed proof
system like ours.
In summary, none of the earlier approaches distribute authorization policies and context
information into multiple administrative domains and explicitly handle trust: confidentiality and integrity. Also, there is no performance study of the earlier systems except for
Generalized RBAC (GRBAC) [31].

7.2

Distributed authorization systems

In this section, we cover distributed authorization systems in which an authorization server
fetches information from remote servers while making an authorization decision. Those
systems are distributed in the sense that a policy maker can define policies that refer to
information or other policies on remote servers. However, the evaluation process of authorization is centralized: a central server that collects all the necessary information from
remote servers makes the authorization decision.
The International Telecommunication Union-Telecommunication Standardization Sec90

tor (ITU-T) X.812 [128] defines a general framework for distributed authorization systems
we discuss in this section. X.812 does not specify particular mechanisms for implementing the framework. The framework is designed to support control of access according to
context information (e.g., time of attempted access and the location of a requester) in a decentralized environment where multiple security domains are involved. An access-control
system in the architecture consists of an Access Control Decision Function (ADF) and an
Access Control Enforcement Function (AEF). An ADF function makes access control decisions by applying access-control policies, and an AEF function enforces the decisions
made by the ADF. To make an authorization decision, ADF collects from other system
entities Access Control Information (ACI), such as context information and attributes of a
requester and a resource. In the X.812 framework, it is possible that an ADF or an AEF
consists of multiple entities in different security domains. However, the X.812 framework
does not define a trust model to exchange information between those entities.
Shibboleth [106], a project of Internet2 [59] and the Middleware Architecture Committee for Education (MACE) [79], defines architectures and policy structures that enable
cross-institutional sharing of web resources. In Shibboleth, a service provider makes an authorization decision based on the attributes of a requester. When a service provider receives
a request from a user at another institute, it contacts the identity provider at the origin site
(where the requester resides) and obtains the attributes of the user who made the request.
In Shibboleth, the message formats and protocols between service providers and identity providers are based on the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [101, 102].
To protect users’ privacy, Shibboleth requires that control of attribute release to service
providers to be available to users as well as administrators. Each user defines attribute release policies that specify which attributes may be disclosed to which service providers,
and the attribute authority module in the identity provider enforces those policies when attributes of a user is requested by a service provider. Shibboleth also allows a user to access
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a web resource anonymously through the use of a pseudonymous identifier. Shibboleth
defines a standard set of attributes that are widely used in the institutes of higher education.
Shibboleth does not specify any particular authorization language. Therefore, each service
provider needs to convert attribute assertion messages in SAML to statements in its own
authorization language.
SPADE [89] provides Shibboleth with an authorization system that limits access to
users’ attributes in identity providers. SPADE collaborates with the attribute authority
module in an identity provider to provide a mechanism that retrieves an attribute release
policy (ARP) and makes an access-control decision for the user’s attributes requested by
a service provider. SPADE supports delegation of authority with SPKI/SDSI [36, 97] to
maintain ARPs in a decentralized way; a principal with a senior role in an organization
can delegate authority to define ARPs to junior principals by issuing SPKI delegation certificates. SPADE combines the ARPs defined by multiple principals in a delegation chain
and derives authorization policies for each attribute of a user. We cover SPKI/SDSI in
Section 7.3 in more detail.
Woo [123, 124] proposes a logic-based approach to support authorization in a distributed environment. Woo defines an authorization language based on a first-order logic
to separate policies from mechanisms that depend on a particular implementation. Woo’s
language is designed to express relationships among users’ privileges. For example, when
we define a policy that allows principal P who possesses a privilege for reading a document
a to read another document b, the policy could be defined as follows.

read(P, a) ⇒ read(P, b)

where read is a predicate that denotes the read privilege. Their language also supports
predicates that express the state of a system, such as CPU load, and it is, therefore, possible
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to define authorization policies based on a limited set of dynamic attributes. Since Woo’s
language supports rules that derive negative rights as well as positive rights, an authorization engine that evaluate the rules could produce two conflicting decisions: grant and
deny. Woo does not discuss how such a conflict should be resolved. Although Woo claims
that it is possible to manage authorization policies and facts in different administrative domains, there is no detail about mechanism for sharing those policies across the domains.
Woo later developed a distributed authorization system [125] where a central authorization
server makes an authorization decision on behalf of a resource owner. The server collects
all the information that is necessary to make an authorization decision from other servers.
Authorization policies are represented as a generalized access-control list (GACL) where
authorization policies are associated with each field in an access-control list.
Jajodia [60] proposes a mechanism for resolving conflicting decisions in a Prolog-like
logic-based language. They provide a set of built-in predicates to define rules to resolve the
conflicts.
The OASIS eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 2.0 [129] is an authorization language based on the Extensible Markup Language (XML). XACML enables
a policy maker to define an attribute-based authorization policy: a request from a user
contains the attributes of the requester and the requested resource, and only the policies
whose attributes match the attributes in the request are evaluated to make an authorization
decision. In XACML, it is possible to define additional constraints as boolean conditions
combined with disjunction and conjunction operators; a policy in XACML is equivalent
to a statement in propositional logic. A policy can refer to sub-policies defined by other
servers, and, therefore, the policy can contain nested sub-policies of an arbitrary depth.
Since multiple policies for a given request might derive different authorization decisions,
XACML provides a mechanism for resolving such a conflict using a policy-combining
algorithm.
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XACML also defines a distributed architecture that involves four types of system entities: a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), a Policy Decision Point (PDP), a Policy Information Point (PIP), and a Policy Administration Point (PAP). When a PEP receives a request
from a user, it enforces an authorization decision made by a PDP. When it receives a request
from a PEP, a PDP makes an authorization decision by evaluating applicable policies and
returns a response that contains a granting decision. The PDP obtains authorization policies and attribute values from PAPs and PIPs respectively. XACML defines the formats of
a request and a response messages between a PEP and a PDP. However, it does not specify
a protocol for transporting messages between the two parties. Furthermore, how a PDP
collects policies and attributes from PIPs and PAPs is outside the scope of the XACML 2.0
specification.
The architecture of XACML is decentralized in the sense that authorization policies are
defined and maintained by different parties and that those policies are enforced at multiple
PEPs. However, for a given request, a single PDP needs to collect the policies and attributes
that are necessary to make an authorization decision. That is, the PDP must retrieve all the
sub-policies that are referred to in the authorization policies for the request. The current
XACML 2.0 specification does not standardize either a mechanism for resolving a policy
reference to the corresponding policy in a remote PAP or a mechanism for delegating the
evaluations of sub-policies to other PDPs. It is up to each implementor whether to support
a mechanism that enables multiple PDPs to evaluate an authorization query in a collaborative way. Sun’s XACML implementation [109] provides a mechanism that enables a PDP
to delegate the evaluation of a sub-policy to another PDP. However, there is no explicit
mechanisms for specifying integrity and confidentiality policies.
Collaboration among system entities in XACML needs a trust model among those entities. However, mechanisms for trust establishment between system entities are outside
the scope of the XACML 2.0 specification and is left open to each implementer. For ex94

ample, XACML does not provide a way to specify integrity and confidentiality policies
on authorization policies maintained in PAPs, as discussed in Section 9.2 of the XACML
2.0 specification [129]. Lorch [78] reports an experience applying XACML to other distributed authorization systems, such as Shibboleth [106] and PRIMA [77], and concludes
that XACML’s authorization language is flexible enough to support policies in those systems.
The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [101, 102] is an XML-based framework for exchanging security information between online business partners. SAML defines
XML-based common message formats for security assertions, such as authentication statements, attribute statements, and authorization decision statements. In addition, SAML defines an application-layer protocol for exchanging security assertions and specifies bindings
that detail how the SAML protocols are mapped onto transport protocols such as Simple
Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 1.1 [107]. However, SAML does not define syntax for
encoding a proof that consists of policies (rules) and attributes (facts) as our system does.
XACML and SAML are complimentary because XACML only defines a request and
response format for a PEP and a PDP and does not specify protocols for obtaining attributes
and policies. SAML could be used to implement a protocol that transports messages between a PEP and a PDP. Also, a PDP can obtain attribute assertions from PIPs via a protocol
in SAML.
There are several distributed authorization systems based on XACML and SAML.
Cardea [68] is a distributed authorization system that adopts XACML for evaluating an
authorization request and SAML for exchanging security assertions among system entities. Since the collection of attributes is outside the scope of the XACML specification,
Cardea introduces a SAML PDP that handles a SAML authorization request and constructs
a XACML authorization request, which is passed to an XACML PDP that actually evaluates authorization policies. The SAML PDP is responsible for collecting attributes from
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Attribute Authorities via a protocol defined in SAML. Cardea assumes that a SAML PDP
maintains a mapping table between a resource requested in an authorization request and a
set of attributes; that is, an SAML PDP knows which attributes an XACML PDP needs in
order to evaluate a given authorization request, and includes those attributes into the authorization request to the XACML PDP. Since an XACML PDP is not capable of retrieving
attributes that are referred to in its policies, an SAML PDP must know a set of policies that
are applied to a given request in advance and it must include all the necessary attributes
in the XACML authorization request. The XACML PDP in a single host makes an authorization decision with all the necessary policies and attributes. In Cardea, an SAML PDP
relies on an external directory service, such as a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP) [67] server, to locate trusted attribute authorities and trusted XACML PDPs.
Stowe [108] extends Sun’s XACML implementation [109] to support a mechanism for
PDP collaboration. In PDP collaboration, a PDP that receives an authorization query forwards that query to multiple external PDPs and makes an authorization decision by combining the responses from those external PDPs. Each PDP maintains a list of trusted external
PDPs to which it forwards a received query. In Stowe’s scheme, each PDP applies the
same list of trusted PDPs to all different queries. Mazzuca [83] later extends Stowe’s system into the eXtensible Distributed Access Control (XDAC) system where multiple PDPs
contribute to an authorization decision. To overcome the incompatibility between SAML
and XACML, syntax for SAML assertions is extended to include XACML attributes and
results. First, a PDP can retrieve a policy from another PDP. Second, a PDP issues an authorization query to other PDPs as in Stowe’s PDP collaboration. Mazzuca discussed the
issue of confidential policies and attributes, which is involved in the collaboration of PDPs.
First, a PDP might want to keep a requested policy from another PDP confidential. Second,
when a PDP issues a query to another PDP, some confidential attributes might be passed
along with the query to the receiving PDP. However, the system does not provide mecha96

nism for defining and enforcing confidentiality policies on policies and attributes. The trust
model of the XDAC system is same as that of Stowe’s system: each PDP maintains a truststore that contains certificates of trusted PDPs. Similarly, each PEP maintains a truststore
of trusted PDPs. The XDAC system caches recent decisions on a PEP’s local memory. The
cached decisions are maintained in a linked list. The PEP specifies the lifetime of each element and the maximum number of elements in the cache. There is no explicit mechanism
for revoking a cached decision when an attribute that is used to derive the decision changes
its value.
Akenti [111] is an authorization service, which corresponds to a Policy Decision Point
(PDP) in XACML, that supports X.509 [127] identified users. An authorization policy in
Akenti consists of a set of policy certificates issued by multiple authorities in different security domains, but the Akenti policy engine needs to collect all the relevant certificates to
make an authorization decision for the user and the resource. The engine finds all the necessary certificates by searching in the URLs specified in the policy certificates. In Akenti,
all the policies and attributes of a user or a resource are expressed in XML.
PRIMA [77] is an authorization system in a grid environment where resources are nodes
with computational capability. PRIMA uses X.509 attribute certificates [127] to represent
user privileges. The architecture of PRIMA is similar to those of XACML and ITU-T
X.812 [128]; a policy decision point collects certificates and makes authorization decisions.
In summary, distributed authorization systems provide a mechanism for fetching policies and other information from remote servers. The architecture of those systems except
for Sun’s XACML [109] are centralized in the sense that there is a single server that collects
all the information for making an authorization decision. Those systems do not provide explicit mechanism for establishing trust among principals in terms of the confidentiality and
integrity of sharing information.
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7.3

Trust management systems

Trust management systems are distributed authorization systems in which authorization
policies express trust relations among principals. Blaze [19] first introduced the notion of a
trust management system that determines whether a set of credentials satisfy authorization
policies for the given request. In a trust management system, the process of authentication is integrated with that of authorization, and there is no clear distinction between those
processes. When a trust management system converts credentials issued by remote principals to statements in its authorization language, those statements are explicitly associated
with the issuers of those credentials in the authorization language of the trust management
system. For example, in PolicyMaker [19, 20] and KeyNote [18], a policy consists of a
statement and the public key of a principal that issues that statement. Trust management
systems based on logic [3, 6, 34, 61, 74] introduce the modal operator, says, to specify the
issuer of a statement. Others also provide some language constructs to represent the issuer
of a statement explicitly.
The earlier trust management systems [3, 19, 36, 74] only provide the functionality
for evaluating an authorization query, assuming that all the necessary credentials issued
by remote principals are collected in a single server and are converted into statements in
their authorization languages. Subsequent trust management systems incorporate those
functionalities into their systems. KeyNote [18] performs the verification and conversion of
credentials. Bauer’s distributed proving system [9], Binder [34], REFEREE [29], SD3 [61],
and the Trust Policy Language (TPL) support a mechanism for fetching credentials from
remote servers while processing authorization policies. We first cover the trust management
systems originally proposed by Blaze [19]. Next, we cover systems whose focus is to
support the delegation of authority. Finally, we describe the most general trust management
systems whose policies are based on logic.
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PolicyMaker [19, 20] is a trust management system that determines whether a particular
set of credentials satisfy authorization policies. PolicyMaker eliminates the boundary between an authentication process and an authorization process; PolicyMaker does not have
a separate authentication process that verifies the identity of a requester. The core of the
PolicyMaker trust management system is a function that takes as inputs a request, a set
of local policies, and a set of credentials and that returns a boolean decision (yes or no),
depending on whether the credentials constitute a proof that the request complies with the
policies. Therefore, this functionality is called compliance checking. The enforcement of
an authorization decision is left open to each application that issues the authorization query;
PolicyMaker just provides an application with an answer for the authorization query.
PolicyMaker expresses both policies and credentials as an assertion that consists of a
set of predicates, and one or more public keys. The predicates check the attributes of a
request and an environment (including information about the current context). If a source
principal that issues an assertion holds authority for the compliance checking of a request,
that assertion is applied to the request to obtain principals to which the authority is delegated; that is, if the predicates in the assertion are evaluated to be true, the authority for
compliance checking is delegated to the set of principals in the assertion. In PolicyMaker,
any language that can be safely interpreted can be used as a language for implementing
predicates. For example, a variant of AWK without file I/O operations and with program
execution time limits is provided as a sample language. Initially, a local principal that handles a request has the authority for compliance checking and, therefore, a local policy is
applied to the request first. Once the authority is delegated to other principals, credentials
signed by those principals can be applied to the request in the same way. This process is
iterated until the principal that issues the request gains the authority for the request or until
the function exhausts all applicable assertions. Thus, the problem of compliance checking
is to find a sequence of assertions that derive a requesting principal as the authority for
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claiming the statement in the request.
Blaze [20] shows that compliance checking in the general case is undecidable, and PolicyMaker, therefore, only supports a special case that does not support negative credentials.
PolicyMaker also assumes that the time complexity of each local function associated with
a policy or a credential is bounded. The algorithm for the special case runs in polynomial
time. The collection and verification of credentials is outside the scope of PolicyMaker;
that is, an application that issues a query to PolicyMaker is responsible for collecting credentials and checking cryptographic digital signatures.
KeyNote [16, 17, 18] is a descendant of PolicyMaker. In addition to the original goals
of PolicyMaker, KeyNote aims to standardize a language syntax for policies and credentials and to ease the integration of the trust management engine into applications. KeyNote
requires that policies and credentials are written in a specific language so that they can be
handled smoothly with KeyNote’s compliance checker. KeyNote is responsible for checking cryptographic digital signatures. However, it does not automatically fetch credentials
from remote hosts.
REFEREE [29] is a trust management system for web applications. REFEREE provides
both a general policy-evaluation mechanism and a language for specifying trust policies.
Referee’s policies, which are represented as s-expressions, specify conditions on attributes
of credentials fetched from remote hosts. Referee’s engine provides mechanisms for fetching and verifying credentials from remote hosts.
Herberg [50] developed a Trust Policy Language (TPL) that maps public keys of principals to business roles, based on certificates issued by third parties. A role in TPL is a
group of entities that represent a specific organization unit. TPL is written in XML, and
the expressiveness of TPL is equivalent to a logic-based language, such as Prolog. TPL
is designed to simplify the syntax of a policy that needs multiple parties to sign the same
statement about the attributes of a user. There are two major differences from prior trust
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management systems such as PolicyMaker [19], KeyNote [18], and REFEREE [29]. First,
TPL supports negative certificates as well as positive certificates. It is, however, necessary
for a policy maker to define where the policy engine searches for negative certificates. Second, the TPL policy engine provides a mechanism for collecting missing certificates from
remote hosts. The TRL policy engine is a single point that collects all the policies and
certificates to assign roles to users.
The Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) [36] defines a standard for authorization
certificates. A SPKI certificate binds either a name or a key to authorization. SPKI defines
an internal representation of certificates as well as its own certificate format in order to handle PGP certificates [92] and X.509 certificates [127]. The SPKI incorporates local names
defined by a Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI) [97] so that fully qualified
linked names represent globally unique names. SPKI internal representation encodes the
delegation of authorization rights as a 5-tuple that consists of an issuer, a subject, a boolean
flag, authorization, and validity dates. The boolean flag specifies whether the subject is
permitted by the issuer to further propagate the authorization; SPKI does not support integer control to restrict the depth of delegation. The authorization field is represented as
an S-expression (a LISP-like parenthesized expression) that contains a set of primitive permissions. An authorization is granted if there is a delegation path from a principal in an
access-control list that protects a resource to a principal that makes a request. Although
there is a general algorithm for finding the delegation path from a set of unordered certificates in a central repository, the designers of SPKI expect that each principal who is granted
some authority should receive a sequence of certificates delegating that authority and that
the algorithm might be used only rarely.
The attribute-based privilege management infrastructure (PMI) [64] applies X.509 attribute certificates to enable a principal to delegate its privileges to another principal. A
privilege verifier makes an authorization decision by checking whether there is a delega101

tion chain of certificates from the source of authority, which is trusted by the privilege
verifier with respect to assignments of privileges to principals, to the principal that issues
the request. There is no detail about the mechanism for collecting certificates and checking
the delegation chain.
As part of the Digital Distributed System Security Architecture [39, 40], the logic of
authentication [3, 66, 122] provides a formal way to define authorization policies that consider statements made by different principals in a distributed environment. The logic of
authentication handles only propositional statements that do not contain variables. However, new operators in modal logic [56] are introduced to express different principals’ belief
in a distributed environment. Those operators makes it possible to define rules that derive
a principal’s belief based on other principals’ belief. For example, we can use the operator
says to express a principal A’s belief on a statement s. The statement A says s means that
principal A believes that the statement s is true. The speaks for operator, which is denoted
as ⇒, allows us to define principal A’s belief based on principal B’s belief. The statement
A ⇒ B means that if principal A believes that a statement s is true, then principal B also
believes s to be true; that is, this statement allows principal B to delegate its authority to
principal A. A request is granted if the system generates a proof that a requesting principal p
speaks for one of principals in the access-control list on the requested resource. Lampson’s
implementation [66] assumes that a server that makes an authorization decision collects
all the certificates to construct a proof. The subsequent logic-based trust management systems [6, 9, 34, 61, 74] incorporate the modal operators in the logic of authentication into
their logic-based languages using the same or similar syntax. SPKI/SDSI [36, 97] supports the notion of speaks for relation between two principals, but uses different syntax.
Howell [55] defines the semantics of SPKI based on the logic of authentication.
Aura [7] models delegation certificates as a directed graph, where nodes represent principals’ keys and edges represent access rights, and studies an efficient algorithm to find
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a delegation chain for making an authorization decision. Aura’s algorithm combines a
depth-first forward search and a breadth-first backward search to handle threshold certificates efficiently.
Snowflake [54] is a delegation-based authorization system based on SPKI. Howell [55]
extends Abadi’s logic of authentication [3] to formally define the semantics of SPKI that
includes restricted delegation. Howell’s logic represents restricted delegation as A ⇒T B
where A and B are principals and T is a set of permissions to be delegated. We read
this statement as “principal A speaks for principal B regarding the statements in T .” In
Snowflake, a client who makes a request is responsible for constructing a proof. When
the client issues the request, a server returns a principal that the client must speak for
and the minimum restriction set that the delegation must allow. The client’s prover object
constructs a proof that derives a statement that a client speaks for the given principal by
traversing search space from that principal.
Proof-carry authorization (PCA) [6] uses higher-order logic, in which we can quantify
formulas, to define authorization policies. The goal of PCA is to prove application-specific
rules, which appears in Abadi’s logic and SPKI, as lemmas proved from a single set of
inference rules. Since higher-order logic in PCA is undecidable, PCA puts the burden of
constructing a proof on a client principal. Bauer [10, 11] later developed a web-based authorization system based on PCA. In Bauer’s system, a client constructs a proof by responding to a challenge issued from the server. Although the server could hide some confidential
policies from the client, there is no unified mechanism that protects confidential credentials
that the client collects from other servers.
Ranganathan [95] proposes to use a first-order logic to model a user’s context and to
reason about it. To reason with context information stored in multiple hosts, each context
provider on those hosts provides an interface that handles a query from a remote host. However, their scheme does not provide a way to define confidentiality and integrity policies on
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rules and facts in a knowledge base of each host, and thus does not have any mechanism for
protecting confidential rules and facts, either. Their system does not support any caching
mechanism that stores retrieved facts from remote hosts.
Delegation Logic (DL) [74, 75] is a logic-based language for trust management systems. The major difference from earlier trust management systems, such as PolicyMaker [19]
and KeyNote [18], is that the semantics of DL is defined based on a well-studied logic
programming language. The monotonic version of DL, called D1LP, is based on Datalog [113], which does not support negated atoms and functions with non-zero arities. D1LP
extends Datalog by introducing explicit constructs for expressing delegations with integer
depths and complex principal structures such as a k-out-of-n threshold that requires agreement among k out of n principals. DL supports the construct says to express a rule or a
fact stated by a remote principal, and this construct allows a policy maker to express trust
on a remote principal’s statement. Since DL provides a language construct for expressing
trust in the integrity of a statement, it is possible to define a rule that refers to a principal’s
attribute to decide whether the principal’s statement is trustworthy. On the other hand, our
scheme does not have this flexibility, because our integrity policy is a list of principals.
DL uses the construct delegates to express the delegation of authority; for example,

Bob delegates access(docZ)∧ 1 to David.

The above rule states that Bob delegates the authority to access docZ to David, and the
depth of the delegation is 1, which means that Bob does not trust people that Dave trusts.
Ninghui [75] shows that there exists a function that converts a DL program into the equivalent Datalog program by introducing the predicates holds and delegates. The function is
computable in polynomial time with respect to the size of the program and the maximum
delegation depth. Since Datalog is computationally tractable, DL is proved to be tractable
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as well.
An authorization engine that supports DL needs to collect all the credentials that are
necessary to make an authorization decision and translate those credentials into rules in
DL. DL does not provide a mechanism for retrieving credentials from remote servers while
evaluating the request. Li [72] also defines a nonmonotonic version of DL, called D2LP,
that supports negative facts, and reports that it is difficult to support nonmonotonic policies
because complete information is inherently hard to obtain in a distributed environment.
Ninghui [76] later developed the Role-based Trust-management language (RT) that supports role-based access control (RBAC) [103] policies. RT provides a language syntax that
allows each principal to define a local role and to delegate authority to another principal
by including the remote principal’s role in the local role. RT also provides language constructs for defining parameterized roles [42] and separation of duty (SoD). SoD policies
define mutually exclusive roles that a principal cannot hold at the same time. However,
it is difficult to collect complete information in a distributed environment. RT, therefore,
changes the semantics of SoD so that the policy does not involve negative statements; that
is, if there is a task that involves multiple roles, RT provides a language construct that ensures that each role is hold by a different principal. The semantics of RT is defined with a
transformation function from RT to Datalog.
SD3 [61] is a logic-based language for a trust management system. SD3 is an extension
of Datalog [113], which stands for Secure Dynamically Distributed Datalog. SD3 extends
Datalog with SDSI linked local names [2, 97], which are local names paired with public
keys. The expression K$E where K is a key and E is a statement means that a key holder
of K says the statement E. The inference engine of SD3 constructs a proof tree for a given
query so that the querier can verify the correctness of the query result. Its focus is to retrieve
certificates (that correspond to facts in a knowledge base) from remote hosts automatically,
and the whole proof tree is constructed on a central server. Therefore, SD3 requires all the
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remote hosts that provide certificates to trust the central server with the inference engine
to preserve the confidentiality policies of their facts, as in the authorization systems in
Section 7.1. SD3 does not support the transmission of rules in certificates.
Binder [34] is a logic-based authorization language that extends Datalog [113] with a
modal operator says. In Binder, inference engines on different servers can exchange statements (facts or rules) as signed certificates. When a statement is imported into an inference
engine, that statement is automatically quoted with the says operator to differentiate it with
local statements. The says operator can be used to specify trust in the integrity of a fact
maintained in a remote server. For example, the following statement expresses the trust in
an authority at Dartmouth College that possesses the public key rsa:3:clebad8d to say who
is a Dartmouth student.

student(P, Dartmouth) :- rsa:3:clebad8d says student(P, Dartmouth).

This statement corresponds to our integrity policy on a fact. However, Binder does not
provide a way to define trust on a rule, and thus does not have the notion of integrity for a
proof that consists of rules and facts. Although Binder allows multiple servers to exchange
certificates that contain rules and facts, it does not have a mechanism for decomposing a
proof; that is, a server that issues a query collects all the facts and rules for deriving the
query result. Binder provides no mechanism for protecting confidential rules and facts.
Bauer [9] developed a distributed proving system that constructs a proof that grants
access to a resource; a principal that constructs a proof could delegate a task of building a
sub-proof to another principal rather than collecting all the certificates that are necessary to
construct a whole proof. Bauer’s authorization language is based on the logic of authentication [3], and provides the modal operators such as says and speaksfor. Bauer’s scheme is
similar to ours in the sense that a proof is produced by multiple principals in a distributed
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environment. However, their algorithm does not address the issue of protecting confidential
information in certificates, which are used to construct a proof. Like Binder [34], Bauer’s
language uses a construct says, to express trust in the integrity of a fact in a remote server.
However, even if a principal that issues a query trusts the integrity of a principal that handles that query in terms of the integrity of the query result, the handler principal still returns
a proof that contains multiple certificates and thus a whole proof for an initial query is constructed on the host of a principal that issues an initial query. There is no mechanism for
proof decomposition like ours. Although their system caches both positive and negative
facts, it does not support mechanisms for revoking cached information.
The idea of delegating the evaluation of a proof to a trusted server also appears in some
protocols used to verify a certificate in a public-key infrastructure. To verify a certificate,
one must construct a certificate chain from the certificate authority (CA) that issued the
certificate to a CA that is trusted by a querier. The Simple Certificate Validation Protocol
(SCVP) [81] allows a client with limited processing and communication capabilities to ask
a trusted server about the validity of a certificate. The client can specify a list of trusted
CAs in its validation policy to be observed by the server. The client can ask the server to
provide additional information, such as a certification path and corresponding revocation
status, depending on the trustworthiness of the server. Although it is similar to our work
in the sense that the protocol uses the client’s trust in the server to split the overhead of
verifying a certificate between them, it is specialized in handling certificate chains, and
it does not support general rules. In addition, there is no mechanism that addresses the
confidentiality of rules or facts, because cross certificates (trust relations) among CAs are
considered to be public knowledge.
PeerAccess [121] is a framework for reasoning about authorization in a distributed environment. PeerAccess consists of a set of peers that maintain a local knowledge base.
Each peer makes an authorization decision by collecting rules and facts maintained by
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other peers. Each knowledge base also contains release policies that protect the local authorization policies and facts. Release policies in PeerAccess are sticky in the sense that
those policies are permanently attached to the information they protect; that is, PeerAccess
assumes that all peers that exchange their rules and facts with each other enforce the original publishers’ release policies correctly. Although PeerAccess supports mechanisms that
protect confidential authorization policies, each peer needs to collect all the rules and facts
in a proof to make the authorization decision.
We conclude this section with the summary of the major features of the trust management systems, comparing with our system. First, the trust management systems makes an
authorization decisions by considering credentials issued by remote servers. Our system
does that as well because a query result is a logical statement or a proof that is digitally
signed by a remote principal. However, the query result has a more complex structure than
a credential in a trust management system; that is, the query result could be embedded with
other credentials issued by multiple different principals as we describe in Section 3.2 and
Section 4.1 respectively. Second, the trust management systems provide an authorization
language that supports logical inference. There are several systems [9, 34, 61, 74] whose
authorization languages are the extension of Datalog. They all except for D2LP [72] only
support monotonic reasoning and do not support the negation of statements in their language because it is essentially difficult to collect complete information in a distributed environment. Our authorization language, which is also based on Datalog, does not support
nonmonotonic reasoning, either. Third, in trust management systems, all the statements
converted from credentials are explicitly associated with the issuer of that statement. For
example, the modal operator says in a logic-based language combines a statement with its
issuer. It is possible to implicitly specify the trust in the correctness of a statement obtained
from a remote principal by defining a rule that derives a local statement from a statement
in which a trusted remote principal is quoted. That is, the trust management systems based
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on logic incorporate integrity policies into their authorization language. On the other hand,
our system provides a different way to define integrity policies; that is, our integrity policies
are essentially a mapping table that associates a rule or a fact in authorization policies with
a list of trusted principals. The approach with the modal operator allows a policy maker
to specify integrity policies based on rules. For example, a principal p0 can express an
integrity policy that requires two principals p1 and p2 to state a same statement as follows.

loc(P, L) ← p1 says loc(P, L) ∧ p2 says loc(P, L)

In the above policy, a statement of a principal’s location is trusted if principals p1 and p2
agree on the statement. Our system cannot express such integrity policies that involve inference. However, this approach makes it difficult to share integrity policies with other
principals, because there is no explicit distinction between authorization and integrity policies in a trust management system. Integrity policies might be tightly coupled with authorization policies that contain confidential information. Therefore, it is difficult for one
principal to delegate the task of constructing a subproof to another principal. Fourth, the
trust management systems evaluate authorization policies in a central server, although their
authorization policies encode trust relations among different principals. Our system does
not have a central server for evaluating an authorization query to protect the participants’
confidential policies.
In summary, the trust management systems are distributed authorization systems whose
policy languages express integrity policies among principals. Existing trust management
systems except for PeerAccess [121] do not provide an explicit mechanism for expressing
confidentiality policies on rules and facts. Although authorization policies in trust management systems consider trust relations among principals in multiple security domains,
the process of evaluating an authorization query must be performed in a centralized way;
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that is, an authorization decision is made by a central server that collects all the credentials
referred to by the authorization policies.

7.4

Automated trust negotiation systems

An automated trust negotiation (ATN) system [21, 105, 118, 119, 132, 133] is an attributebased authorization system whose focus is to protect authorization policies on resources. In
ATN, a requesting client is responsible for providing attribute certificates in order to show
that the client satisfies the authorization policies for accessing the resource. However,
if the server asks the client to submit a set of certificates, the server might disclose its
confidential policies. To solve this problem, an ATN system treats a policy as a resource to
be protected; that is, an authorization policy that protects a resource can be protected with
another policy, and that meta policy is also protected with another policy recursively. When
a server receives a request for a resource, the server must traverse the policies, starting from
the resource, until it finds the outermost policy, which is not protected with any policy. To
make an authorization decision, the server first checks the outermost unprotected policy
by asking the client to provide certificates that are necessary to check that policy. If the
client satisfies that policy, the server checks the policy protected by the outermost policy.
This process continues until the server checks the confidentiality policy that protects the
requested resource. Similarly, an ATN system considers a client’s certificates as a resource
and has the client define a sequence of policies on a certificate in the same way. Therefore,
the process of making an authorization involves iterative disclosures of certificates between
the client and server.
We can consider an ATN system as the special case of our distributed proof system;
there exist only two principals (i.e., a client and a server) who participate in making an
authorization decision. In this setting, if one principal, who receives a query from another
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principal issues a subsequent query, back to the principal that issues the original query,
the former principal reveals information about the rule that is used to handle the original
query. As we discuss in Section 8.6, we avoid this inference problem by preventing each
server from issuing a circular subsequent query. We believe this solution is satisfactory
for systems in pervasive computing, because a mobile client, who only carries a portable
device, is unlikely to be involved in the process of making a granting decision. (On the
other hand, ATN systems are primarily intended for web applications [120].) If a server
that receives a client’s request issues a subsequent query to another server, the server does
not disclose its authorization policy to the client. Therefore, we do not introduce policies
that protect confidentiality policies, which corresponds to meta policies in an ATN system.
Ye [131] proposes the collaborative trust negotiation scheme for peer-to-peer systems.
In that scheme, a locally trusted third party (LTTP) breaks cyclic interdependent policies
that are involved in the negotiation process between a client and a server. Every server in a
peer-to-peer system could be a LTTP that caches other server’s credentials obtained through
the process of trust negotiation. Also, each server maintains a list of LTTPs that receive
its credentials; each server maintains a different list of LTTPs, depending on with which
servers it succeeded in a trust negotiation. When two parties fails in a trust negotiation,
they try to find a LTTP trusted by both parties. If there exists such a LTTP, that LTTP
disclose the interdependent policies to each negotiating parties to enable them to continue
their negotiation process. Although, Ye’s scheme involves a trusted third party in a trust
negotiation, credentials, which are involved in the negotiation, belong to either a client or
a server; the negotiation does not require credentials from other servers.
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7.5

Secure function evaluation

Secure function evaluation (SFE) [26, 44, 45, 130] is a technique that enables mutually
untrusted principals to compute a function jointly while hiding their inputs from each other;
that is, there is a general algorithm that computes a function f (x1 , . . . , xn ) where xi is
principal pi ’s private input, while ensuring that each principal pi learns only the output of
the function f from the computation. The objective of SFE is similar to ours: We want
mutually untrusted principals to compute an authorization decision with each principal’s
private rules and facts as inputs to the function. However, SFE is not directly applicable
to our problem because the algorithm of the function f to be computed in SFE must be
public knowledge among participating principals before the computation. In our system,
there is no way to know in advance which rules and facts in multiple servers are involved
to make an authorization decision. Nevertheless, in this section, we cover cryptographic
schemes that provide a specialized solution for a two-party SFE problem in order to address
the problem of cyclic policies in automatic trust negotiation systems where a client and a
server possess private attributes and private policies respectively.
Li [73] solves the problem of cyclic policies in an ATN system by applying a two-party
secure function evaluation (SFE) [130]. Li assumes that the content of a certificate is public
and that only the fact that a trusted party signs the certificate is sensitive, and formalizes the
problem as follows: Suppose that Alice and Bob have certificates PA and PB respectively
and that those certificates involve cyclic dependency. Let PA be a pair (MA , ρ) where MA
and ρ are the content and signature of the certificate PA respectively. Alice can disclose MA
to Bob. However, Alice keeps ρ private and Bob keeps PB private as well. Alice and Bob
can break the cyclic policies by jointly computing the function that takes as inputs MA , ρ,
and PB . SFE ensures that Alice and Bob do not learn the other party’s private input (i.e., ρ
or PB ) from the computation and that Alice obtains Bob’s certificate PB at the end of the
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computation if Alice uses a valid signature ρ for the computation. Since this computation
involves the verification of the signatures of the attribute certificates, the general technique
of SFE is computationally expensive. Therefore, Li developed a scheme called oblivious
signature-based envelope (OSBE) to solve this problem efficiently. OSBE enables two
parties to share a secret key through a technique similar to that in the Diffie-Hellman key
agreement protocol [35] if Alice possesses the valid signature for her certificate. At the end
of the OSBE protocol, Alice is able to decrypt Bob’s certificate with the jointly computed
secret key.
Holt proposes the scheme of hidden credentials [53] where a client can decrypt a requested resource if the client possesses the right credentials that satisfy the server’s authorization policies. Holt’s scheme makes use of identity-based encryption [22], in which an
arbitrary string can be used as a public key; that is, a server encrypts a resource with a public
key, which is the concatenation of a client’s identity and an attribute, and the client decrypts
it with the private key that corresponds to the credential specified by the server. In Holt’s
scheme, a client can access a resource without disclosing its credentials, and a server can
protect its policies from a client that does not possess a privilege for accessing the resource.
Holt’s scheme supports a policy represented as a boolean formula containing multiple credentials. A conjunctive policy that requires a client to possess a set of credentials can be
enforced by encrypting a resource recursively with different keys. The disjunctive policy
can be enforced by providing multiple encrypted resources, each of which is encrypted
with a different public key corresponding to a different credential. Holt’s scheme has the
drawback that an authorized client could learn the structure of a policy. Since a public-key
operation in the Holt’s scheme produces ciphertexts longer than the input plain text, it is
possible to infer how many AND operators are contained in a policy. Bradshaw [23] adopts
a secret splitting scheme to avoid disclosing information about the structure of a policy to
an unauthorized client. Frikken [38] proposes a scheme for hidden credentials that provide
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stronger security properties. In Frikken’s scheme, a client does not learn anything about a
server’s policies even if the client has a set of credentials that satisfy the servers’ policies.
Oblivious commitment-based envelope (OCBE) [69] is a scheme that enables oblivious
access control. The scheme of OCBE is similar to that of hidden credentials [23, 38, 53] in
that a server sends a client encrypted information that the client can decrypt if attribute certificates of the client satisfy the server’s policies. OCBE is based the Pedersen commitment
scheme [91], and a client gives a server an attribute certificate that contains the commitment of attribute values. The major difference from the scheme of hidden credentials is
that OCBE supports policies that involve comparison predicates such as ≤ and 6=. Therefore, OCBE allows a server to define a policy that specifies not only an exact value of an
attribute but also an acceptable range of that attribute. OCBE also supports the conjunction
and the disjunction operators to express multiple conditions on the client’s attributes. However, OCBE requires a server to disclose its policies to a client before starting the OCBE
protocol; it does not protect the servers’ private policies even if the client does not have the
privilege to access the requested resource.
Based on OCBE [69], Li [70] developed a scheme called certified input private policy evaluation (CIPPE) for policy-hiding access control. In CIPPE, a client and a server
compute an authorization decision without disclosing the client’s attributes and the server’s
policies to the other party. CIPPE adopts Yao’s scrambled circuit protocol [80, 130] to
protect a server’s policies from the client. The server constructs a scrambled circuit from
its policy and gives it to the client. The client can obtain the input keys of the circuit, which
are necessary to evaluate the circuit with its inputs, if the client’s knows the attributes values that correspond to cryptographic commitments [91] shared with the server as in the
scheme of OCBE. With the correct input keys, the client evaluates the scrambled circuit
and obtains the scrambled output, which must be decrypted by the server. The server finally obtains the decision by decrypting that output received from the client. CIPPE also
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provides a mechanism that makes the topology of a scrambled circuit obscure to avoid
revealing the structure of a policy. Li [71] later proposes a general framework for automatic trust negotiation whose protocol supports cryptographic credentials such as hidden
credentials [23, 38, 53] and OCBE [69].
Hengartner [48, 47] adopts a scheme of hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) [41]
to support oblivious access control in pervasive computing where privileges could be defined hierarchically. In pervasive computing, there are many situations where a clients privilege for accessing fine-grained information allows the client to access coarse information
inferred from the former information. Location information that is defined based on containment relations is such an example. Hengartner’s scheme allows a certificate holder of
fine-grained information to access a resource protected with a policy that refers to coarser
information obtained from the fine-grained information.
In this section, we introduce cryptographic schemes that protect a client’s confidential
credentials from a server. However, those schemes assume that all the credentials and the
authorization policies are managed by a client and a server respectively. Since our system
must deal with a situation where facts and policies are distributed across multiple parties,
the schemes in this section is not applicable to our problem.

7.6

Caching for an inference engine

There is little published about caching for an inference engine. We conclude this chapter
covering a few logic-based systems that support caching mechanisms.
Katsiri [63] built a prototype of a dual-layer knowledge base based on a first-order logic.
The higher Deductive Abstract layer caches abstract context information derived from lowlevel knowledge in the lower layer to make the system scalable. The system consists of a
single server trusted by all and does not support a revocation mechanism in a distributed
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environment.
Wullems [126] developed a role-based authorization system that is similar to OASIS [8,
52]. It has a central server that contains an authorization engine and a context management
service. Context-sensitive policies, which are expressed with a propositional logic, are
used to activate or deactivate a user’s role membership. The server maintains a set of active
roles and reevaluates them when receiving specified triggered context events; that is, the
server caches the privileges of each user as a set of roles. If the role membership status
of a user changes, the server notifies services that make authorization decisions based on
that role membership. However, since the system is centralized, they do not support a
revocation mechanism that involves multiple context management services in a distributed
environment like ours.
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Chapter 8
Discussion
In this chapter, we discuss several design issues, limitations, and security properties of our
system.

8.1

Completeness of our algorithm

The algorithm for the function

GENERATE P ROOF

in Figure 3.10 and Figure 4.6 is not

complete. That is, it is not guaranteed to find a proof that derives a granting decision even
if one exists. This situation could happen when a principal who handles a query is able
to produce multiple alternative proofs. Suppose that the proof that the principal produces
first contains an encrypted subproof obtained from another principal and that encrypted
subproof contains a FALSE value. When the principal returns the proof, a principal who
receives the proof finds that proof invalid after decrypting its embedded subproof. However,
since the principal that returned the proof finished handling the query, that principal is not
able to find another alternative proof.
There are two possible ways to make our algorithm complete. One is to add a mechanism that enables a principal that finishes handling a query to resume processing the same
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query from the previous point of the search space; an inference engine continues to maintain various data structures, such as a proof tree, for a query after a proof for that query is
returned, and those data structures must be associated with a unique identifier of the query
to resume the query handling process. This approach does not waste computing and network resources since a proof is constructed on demand. However, it could consume a lot of
memory to maintain these data structures. Furthermore, this approach makes it possible for
a principal that handles a query to infer the query result in an encrypted subproof produced
by another principal; that is, if a querier principal issues a same query again, the handler
principal can infer that the encrypted subproof embedded in the previous proof contains a
FALSE value. Considering this security issue, we cannot choose the first approach.
The other is to modify an interface for handling a query so that a principal that handles
a query can return multiple alternative proofs together. A querier principal specifies the
number of proofs he needs as a parameter in a query, and the querier and handler principals
maintain a network session until all the proofs are transmitted. This approach does not have
the security risk of the first approach. However, we need to extend the representation of a
proof in Section 4.1 to evaluate a set of alternative subproofs as the disjunction of the query
results in those subproofs. This situation happens when a principal that handles a query
issues a subsequent query and obtains multiple alternative proofs together. If the principal
cannot decrypt those proofs, the principal must embed the disjunction of those proofs into
a proof that the principal returns. Although we believe this approach is feasible, it requires
a lot of changes in our current implementation, such as the algorithm for checking the
integrity of a proof, the data structure of a proof object, and so on. Therefore, we plan to
make our algorithm complete in our future work. Although this approach could consume a
lot of computational and network resources to construct multiple proofs for a single query,
to maintain the cached facts derived from the proof is as efficient as with our original
algorithm since it is not necessary to modify our caching and revocation mechanism in
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Chapter 5. Thus, the amortized performance in common cases may not be unreasonable.

8.2

Security assurance

Our authorization scheme ensures that each principal’s confidentiality policies are preserved while participating in the evaluation of an authorization query. A malicious principal
that represents an internal node of a proof subtree cannot inappropriately obtain a rule or
a fact from other principals by modifying the receivers list in a subquery it issues, because each principal discloses its rules or facts to other principals only if they satisfy its
confidentiality policies as described in Section 4.6.1.
The malicious principal could also modify the integrity policies i policies in a subquery
to disturb the evaluation of a query. This attack can be prevented if every principal publishes
its integrity policies with its digital signature on a well-known server, and each principal can
cache other principal’s integrity policies. The i policies in a query can then be retrieved by
identifying the principal sending the query, which should also be listed last in the receivers
list.
We use a nonce to prevent a reply attack by a malicious party that is capable of intercepting and modifying a message. All the participating principals that evaluate an authorization query use the same nonce, generated by the original querying principal, because
the receiver of a proof might be different from a querier principal. The nonce in a proof
must match the nonce in the query, for the proof to be valid.

8.3

Timeliness of authorization decisions

As we see in Chapter 6, to process an authorization query involves latency for constructing
a proof, and the authorization decision is thus derived from the proof that might contain
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dynamic facts previously published at different times. Since an authorization decision is
made based on information collected in the past, our system might grant a request that
should have been denied if the current information was available to the system. This limitation in our system might allow a malicious user to gain access to a resource illegally
by changing his context from a legitimate state (that grants his access) to an illegitimate
state before the system detects the change of the the user’s context. Therefore, our system
should provide a policy maker with a way to define explicit timeliness constraints on authorization decisions; that is, a policy maker should be able to specify a time T such that
all the information in a proof was published within time T prior to the current time. We
plan to conduct experiments to ensure that our implementation supports a time T , which is
reasoably small enough for most applications.

8.4

Expressiveness of the authorization language

Our example in Section 2.1 represents policies about the current context. Although we do
not treat temporal information specially in our language, our language can express some
policies about historical context by defining predicates that take a timestamp as an argument. The following is an example policy in a workflow system where an authorization
decision is based on whether a requester has performed a series of actions in a specified
sequence.
grant(P, purchase, X) :- approved(mgr, P, X, t1 ), approved(senior mgr, P, X, t2 ), prior(t1 , t2 )

The above policy requires that a requester needs to obtain an approval from the manager
first, and then from the senior manager. The predicate prior is used to check whether
timestamp t1 is prior to t2 . For policies that depend on freshness of information, we could
define the predicate recent that checks the recency of a timestamp using the prior predicate
as follows.
recent(T, X) :- prior(now − X, T ).
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The above rules says that a timestamp T is within the duration X from now if T is later
than the time now - X. We assume that the system define a special dynamic variable “now.”
Our language does not express separation of duty [4] in role-based access control
(RBAC) model [103], because to express separation of duty with a logic language (as Jajodia [60] proposes) requires support for rules that contain the negations of atoms. A querier
possibly obtains a false negative in our system due to the constraints of the security policies
of each principal. Therefore, a query that is a negation of an atom causes false positive,
which is not acceptable to any authorization system.
For the same reason, our system does not support a mechanism for detecting or resolving conflicting facts. That is, if our system constructs a proof that contains the fact
location(bob, sudikoff ), our system considers that proof as valid even under the presense
of a conflicting fact (e.g., location(bob, moore)). To reduce such conflicts in facts, we need
a rule that derives the negation of a fact; however, our authorization language does not
support the negation of atoms. Therefore, we cannot define the rule below to detect Bob’s
conflicting location information.

¬location(bob, L1) :- location(bob, L2), L1 6= L2)

Support for negation and confliction detection is future work.

8.5

User feedback

It would be useful, in the case of a FALSE proof, to provide some feedback for the user
about why the proof failed and what policies prevent them from obtaining the desired access. Although to return an incomplete proof is a plausible solution, there are two issues
to be addressed. First, due to confidentiality policies the user may not be allowed to re-
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ceive the incomplete proof, and, as a result, the user is not able to know which subproof
failed. Second, because there could be multiple incomplete proofs for a given query, we
need some mechanism that chooses a useful proof for the user from them. The KNOW
system [62], which is a centralized rule-based authorization system, uses a cost function to
rank proofs for a query based on the likeliness that the user is able to satisfy the conditions
in the proofs. It is, however, difficult to define a reasonable cost function in a decentralized
system like ours because there is no single administrator who knows all the rules and security policies that are involved in authorization decisions. We leave this complex problem
for future work.

8.6

Information leak through inference

In our system, it is possible for a principal who receives a query to issue a subsequent
query to the principal who issues the original query. This opportunity allows the querier
principal to learn the handler principal’s confidential rule. For example, suppose that
a principal p0 issues a query ?grant(bob, document) and that p1 , who maintains a rule
grant(P, document) :- employee(P, IBM ), issues a query ?employee(bob, IBM ) to principal p0 . Then, principal p0 learns that p1 ’s granting policy depends on the requester’s
employment, although p0 is not sure whether there are any other conditions to be granted
access. One possible solution is to prevent each principal that handles a query from issuing
a query to a principal in the receivers list of that query. We also need to consider this issue
to design the user feedback mechanism we discuss in the previous section.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
This dissertation presents a secure distributed proof system for context-sensitive authorization. We first summarize our contributions, discuss limitations of and future work for the
system, and finally conclude.

9.1

Contributions

Any context-sensitive authorization system will necessarily be distributed, because context
information and rules will be produced at different places by different parties, and the
confidentiality of those information must be protected in a decentralized way. A large
trusted server, which is adopted by earlier context-sensitive authorization systems, is not
realistic. We take a logic-based approach to address the issue of information sharing across
multiple administrative domains and build a secure distributed proof system for contextsensitive authorization. Our system enables multiple hosts to evaluate an authorization
query in a peer-to-peer way, while preserving the confidentiality and integrity policies of
mutually untrusted principals running those hosts. The primary contributions of this thesis
are
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• support for fine-grained security policies that formally define trust relations among
principals in terms of information confidentiality and integrity;
• a distributed algorithm that enables multiple principals to construct a proof in a peerto-peer way, while preserving the integrity and confidentiality policies of those principals;
• a soundness proof of the algorithm;
• the design and implementation of a secure distributed proof system;
• a novel and efficient caching and revocation mechanism that considers the dependency of context information, which is frequently changing, across multiple servers;
and
• a detailed performance study of our system showing that the amortized performance
of our system scales to a large proof that spans across dozens of servers.

9.2

Limitations and future work

We discuss several limitations of our system in Chapter 8 and summarize them below.
Our system is not guaranteed to find a proof that satisfies the security policies of each
principal, as we discuss in Section 8.1. Therefore, we need to modify the current algorithm
to ensure completeness of our algorithm. We also need to modify our algorithm to prevent
the inference attack described in Section 8.6. We need a feedback mechanism in Section 8.5
for a user whose request is denied.
There are possible extensions to our current system. First, it is necessary to protect
the confidentiality of a query itself in some situations, because issuing a certain query
might imply the querier’s interest, which he does not want to disclose. We plan to add a
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mechanism for protecting each principals’ queries. Second, our system still fails to construct a proof if our system cannot satisfy all the participants’ security policies. We plan to
improve the possibility of constructing a proof by facilitating information sharing among
mutually untrusted principals with the technique of secure multi-party computation [46]
and anonymization [115, 37]. Third, there are many situations where we have to deal with
context information with varying uncertainty. We, therefore, plan to extend our authorization and policy languages to handle probabilistic context information. Fourth, we plan to
apply our distributed proof system to different applications, such as a resource discovery
system for pervasive computing, to generalize the functionality of our system. Finally, we
need understand threats to integrity of raw sensor data in all context-sensitive authorization
systems.

9.3

Conclusions

We present a secure distributed proof system for context-sensitive authorization. Our system enables multiple hosts to evaluate an authorization query in a peer-to-peer way, while
preserving the confidentiality and integrity policies of mutually untrusted principals running those hosts. We show that it is possible to derive an authorization decision, even
though authorization rules and context information referred to by those rules are distributed
across multiple domains and are protected with different confidentiality policies.
We also developed a novel caching and revocation mechanism that improves the performance of our system. Our capability-based revocation mechanism combines an eventbased push mechanism with a query-based pull mechanism where each server recursively
publishes revocation messages over a network by maintaining dependencies among local
and remote cached facts.
Our experimental results show that the performance overhead of public-key operations
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involved in the process of a remote query were large and that our caching mechanism
significantly reduced the amortized latency for handling a query. The results show that our
system should be suitable to a context-aware application in which a user’s privileges must
be continuously monitored. Since our experiments were conducted with a wide range of
parameters, the results serve as guidelines about the worst-case performance of a systems
that adopts our techniques.
Although we describe our system in the context of a logic-based authorization system,
we believe our scheme is general enough to support various kinds of rule-based policies in
pervasive computing.
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